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ALTERNATIVE COURTS 
AND DRUG TREATMENT:  
FINDING A REHABILITATIVE SOLUTION 
FOR ADDICTS IN A RETRIBUTIVE SYSTEM 
Molly K. Webster* 
 
Sentencing drug crimes and treating drug-addicted defendants often stem 
from contradictory theories of punishment.  In the late twentieth century, 
courts traded rehabilitation for retributive ideals to fight the “War on 
Drugs.”  However, beginning with the Miami-Dade Drug Court, treatment 
and rehabilitation have returned to the forefront of sentencing policy in 
traditional and alternative drug courts. 
Jurisdictions have implemented a variety of policies designed to treat 
addiction as opposed to punishing it.  Community courts, such as the Red 
Hook Community Justice Center in Brooklyn, New York, community-panel 
drug courts, such as the Woodbury County Community Drug Court in Iowa, 
and Hawaii’s Opportunity Probation with Enforcement represent efforts to 
address treatment within the court system.  This Note argues that certain 
policies are more likely to benefit drug-addicted defendants than others, 
including procedural justice, predictable sanctions, and an increased focus 
on treatment.  It also posits that qualitative studies measuring long-term 
success of drug treatment programs should be commissioned to ensure that 
drug courts utilize the most effective treatment policies that promote 
rehabilitative ideals. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Twenty-six years ago, the first drug court opened its doors in Miami-
Dade County, Florida.1  Traditional drug courts2 were founded as a reaction 
to retributive sanctions used to fight the “War on Drugs”3 and to relieve 
overburdened criminal courts with high drug-related caseloads.4  Drug 
courts have received praise because they shift the focus of criminal 
sanctions for drug-addicted defendants from punitive to rehabilitative.5 
Subsequent to the founding of drug courts, legislatures and judges across 
the country have created alternatives to the traditional drug court model.6  
These alternatives include community-based approaches,7 swift sanction 
probation programs,8 and a mix of the two.  These programs have aimed to 
correct perceived problems9 with traditional drug courts.  In doing so, 
alternative policies have shifted the way the justice system views, treats, 
and sentences addicts. 
Drug courts and community programs aim to divert alcoholics and 
addicts to an alternative system through which they receive treatment and 
learn how to sustain their sobriety after their interactions with the courts 
end.10  While these programs stress the participant’s rehabilitation,11 their 
 
 1. See Drug Court History, NAT’L ASS’N OF DRUG CT. PROFS., 
http://www.nadcp.org/learn/what-are-drug-courts/drug-court-history (last visited Oct. 21, 
2015) [http://perma.cc/NZ4Q-BM37]. 
 2. This Note distinguishes between “traditional” drug courts, such as the Miami-Dade 
Drug Court, discussed infra Part I.C–D, and “alternative” drug courts, such as community 
courts, community-panel drug courts, and swift-sanction programs, which are the subject of 
this Note and are discussed infra Parts II–IV. 
 3. President Richard Nixon first called for “an effective war” to counteract the 
“national and international” drug problem in an address to Congress in 1971. President 
Richard Nixon, Special Message to the Congress on Drug Abuse Prevention and Control 
(June 17, 1971), 1971 PUB. PAPERS 739.  Despite this rhetoric, it should be noted that 
President Nixon advocated rehabilitative ideals to address the drug problem. See id. at 743–
45 (proposing an allocation of funds “solely for the treatment and rehabilitation of drug-
addicted individuals”). 
 4. See Sheila M. Murphy, Drug Courts:  An Effective, Efficient Weapon in the War on 
Drugs, 85 ILL. B.J. 474, 475 (1997). 
 5. See, e.g., Peggy Fulton Hora et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug 
Treatment Court Movement:  Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System’s Response to 
Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439, 462–68 (1999). 
 6. See, e.g., Dwight Vick & Jennifer Lamb Keating, Community-Based Drug Courts:  
Empirical Success.  Will South Dakota Follow Suit?, 52 S.D. L. REV. 288, 296 (2007) 
(discussing the evolution of drug courts to include community-panel courts). 
 7. For example, the Red Hook Community Justice Center, see infra Part II.A, and the 
Woodbury County Community Drug Court, see infra Part II.B. 
 8. For example, Hawaii’s Opportunity Probation with Enforcement (HOPE) and 
Washington Intensive Supervision Program (WISP) in Hawaii and Washington, respectively. 
See infra Part II.C. 
 9. As discussed infra Part I.D.5, traditional drug courts have had difficulty defining the 
role of the public defender and finding an appropriate medium between punishing drug 
crimes and administering treatment. 
 10. See Murphy, supra note 4, at 476–77. 
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success is largely measured by quantitative statistics:  How many of the 
participants have graduated12 and have the programs reduced recidivism 
rates?13  While these measurements are important, the underlying 
sentencing theory—rehabilitation—requires a more nuanced approach to 
the analysis of the programs.  Treatment programs’ effectiveness must also 
focus on the individual and how she is rehabilitated through the process, 
both in the short and long term. 
This Note discusses the policy implications and effectiveness of 
alternative drug courts.  Part I provides a brief history of the legal policy of 
treating addicts and the founding of state and federal drug courts.14  Part II 
outlines three alternative drug court models:  (i) community courts that use 
a holistic approach to sentencing and treatment, such as the Red Hook 
Community Justice Center;15 (ii) community-panel courts that use 
community volunteers, such as the Woodbury County Community Drug 
Court;16 and (iii) swift and certain sanction programs, such as Hawaii’s 
Opportunity Probation with Enforcement17 (HOPE).  Part III examines the 
success of these programs both quantitatively, analyzing recidivism rates 
and graduation from the programs, and qualitatively, focusing on the 
programs’ effects on individual participants.18 
Finally, Part IV highlights elements of each program that will ensure 
addicts receive appropriate treatment.19  It argues that, to further these 
goals, it is necessary to maintain holistic approaches to sentencing, an 
informal courtroom, and clear and consistent sanctions for program 
violations.  Additionally, research must be conducted that measures 
qualitative data on a long-term basis to ensure that the rehabilitative policies 
have a lasting effect on participants’ recoveries.  These suggested changes, 
if implemented, would ensure that drug-addicted defendants receive the 
tools necessary to be rehabilitated. 
 
 11. See id. at 477. 
 12. See, e.g., WEST HUDDLESTON & DOUGLAS B. MARLOWE, NAT’L DRUG COURT INST., 
PAINTING THE CURRENT PICTURE:  A NATIONAL REPORT ON DRUG COURTS AND OTHER 
PROBLEM-SOLVING COURT PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 32 (2011), http://www.ndci.org/ 
sites/default/files/nadcp/PCP%20Report%20FINAL.PDF [http://perma.cc/UJ47-U3EW]. 
 13. See, e.g., MICHAEL REMPEL ET AL., CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, THE NEW YORK 
STATE ADULT DRUG COURT EVALUATION:  POLICIES, PARTICIPANTS AND IMPACTS 83–113 
(2003), http://www.courts.state.ny.us/whatsnew/pdf/NYSAdultDrugCourtEvaluation.pdf 
(measuring drug courts’ success using rates of recidivism) [http://perma.cc/75YN-HMWF]. 
 14. See infra Part I. 
 15. See infra Part II.A. 
 16. See infra Part II.B. 
 17. See infra Part II.C. 
 18. See infra Part III. 
 19. See infra Part IV. 
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I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE POLICY AND PRACTICE 
OF TREATING ADDICTS 
Statutes criminalizing drug use have existed throughout the twentieth 
century.20  However, the 1960s and 1970s saw a cultural shift:  drug use 
and drug-related arrests increased dramatically.21  This “drug revolution”22 
led to federal legislation such as the Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control Act of 197023 and the Rockefeller Drug Laws in 
1973.24  While lawmakers had previously used rehabilitation theory in 
formulating sentencing regimes,25 the “War on Drugs” led to a shift in 
sentencing policy in the United States26—and with it, a changing view of 
the addict as criminal.27 
This part examines the history of drug crimes and courts as they relate to 
the theories of punishment.  First, this part reviews the four theories of 
punishment—rehabilitation, deterrence, retributivism, and incapacitation—
as they relate to the definition of addiction.  Second, this part tracks the 
criminal justice system’s struggle with understanding addiction in legal 
terms.  Subsequently, this part discusses the formation and structure of the 
first drug courts.  Finally, this part explores the basic model for traditional 
drug courts, the common eligibility requirements, and the structure of the 
treatment programs as a means for comparison with the alternative 
treatment programs that are the subject of this Note. 
 
 20. For example, the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 criminalized the manufacture, sale, 
and possession of opiates, cocaine, and the nonmedical use of marijuana. See Pub. L. No. 75-
238, 50 Stat. 551 (1937). 
 21. See DUANE C. MCBRIDE ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE DRUGS-CRIME WARS:  
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN THEORY, POLICY, AND PROGRAM INTERVENTIONS 
99 (2003), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/194616d.pdf [http://perma.cc/8PW6-6PKF]. 
 22. See id. 
 23. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 
U.S.C.). 
 24. The Rockefeller Drug Laws, N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 220.00–.65 (McKinney 2013), 
imposed mandatory minimum prison sentences for drug-related crimes and were often 
criticized, even by New York State judges. See People v. Stephens, 431 N.E.2d 972, 973 
(1981) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting) (referring to the Rockefeller Drug Laws as “draconian” 
and “inexorable”). 
 25. See Francis T. Cullen & Paul Gendreau, Assessing Correctional Rehabilitation:  
Policy, Practice, and Prospects, 3 POLICIES, PROCESSES & DECISIONS CRIM. JUST. SYS. 109, 
111 (2000) (“Since virtually the inception of the modern criminal justice system, a persistent 
response to the question of what to do with lawbreakers has been to change them into law-
abiders—that is, to rehabilitate them.”); infra Part I.A. 
 26. See Francis T. Cullen, Rehabilitation:  Beyond Nothing Works, 42 CRIME & JUST. 
299, 314 (2013) (noting that “[b]y the mid-1970s’ [sic], it had become common to ask, ‘Is 
rehabilitation dead?’”). 
 27. As some critics note, with his “War on Drugs” campaign, President Nixon 
“transformed the public image of the drug user into one of a dangerous and anarchic threat to 
American civilization,” stating “[i]n fact, [their] incarceration was for the nation’s own 
good.” Emily Dufton, The War on Drugs:  How President Nixon Tied Addiction to Crime, 
THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/03/the-war-
on-drugs-how-president-nixon-tied-addiction-to-crime/254319/ [http://perma.cc/A5FB-GX 
6H]. 
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A.  Rehabilitation and Drug Crimes:  
The Theories of Punishment 
Drug addicts present a quandary for the criminal justice system:  How 
should a court punish an individual for whom criminal behavior is the result 
of an underlying disease?28  One of the primary tenets of drug courts is to 
move away from the retributive ideals of the 1970s and 1980s29 toward a 
rehabilitative goal.30 
While rehabilitation has historically been a primary tenet of sentencing 
policy,31 the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries mark the introduction of 
another theory of punishment that focused on punishing offenders for their 
wrongs—retributivism.32  These two competing theories—rehabilitation 
and retributivism—were utilized in formulating modern drug crime 
policy.33 
 
 28. The American Society of Addiction Medicine, a member of the American Medical 
Association, defines addiction as 
a primary, chronic disease of brain reward, motivation, memory and related 
circuitry. Dysfunction in these circuits leads to characteristic biological, 
psychological, social and spiritual manifestations.  This is reflected in an 
individual pathologically pursuing reward and/or relief by substance use and other 
behaviors. 
  Addiction is characterized by inability to consistently abstain, impairment in 
behavioral control, craving, diminished recognition of significant problems with 
one’s behaviors and interpersonal relationships, and a dysfunctional emotional 
response.  Like other chronic diseases, addiction often involves cycles of relapse 
and remission.  Without treatment or engagement in recovery activities, addiction 
is progressive and can result in disability or premature death. 
Definition of Addiction, AM. SOC’Y OF ADDICTION MED., http://www.asam.org/for-the-
public/definition-of-addiction (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/4EAS-QHYY].  
One working definition of recovery is “a process of change through which an individual 
achieves abstinence and improved health, wellness and quality of life.” Definition of 
Recovery, NAT’L COUNCIL ON ALCOHOLISM & DRUG DEPENDENCE INC., 
https://ncadd.org/recovery-support/definition (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma. 
cc/TJ9S-YTNK]. 
 29. See John S. Goldkamp, The Drug Court Response:  Issues and Implications for 
Justice Change, 63 ALB. L. REV. 923, 932 (2000); Adam Lamparello, Reaching Across Legal 
Boundaries:  How Mediation Can Help the Criminal Law in Adjudicating “Crimes of 
Addiction”, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 335, 340 (2001) (“By the 1970s, the optimism 
and idealism that characterized the reformation movement slowly began to evaporate, as 
rehabilitation experienced a series of vicious criticisms, examining both its theoretical 
foundations and practical efficacy.”). 
 30. See Martin I. Reisig, Rediscovering Rehabilitation:  Drug Courts, Community 
Corrections and Restorative Justice, 1998 MICH. B.J. 172, 174, http://www.reisigmediation. 
com/pdf/reisit-mbj-02.1998.pdf (“The drug court movement represents a real effort at 
rehabilitation and is quickly gaining in sophistication.”) [http://perma.cc/J4F9-Z3ZD]. 
 31. See Cullen & Gendreau, supra note 25. 
 32. See ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING § 1:2 (West 2014).  One of the 
earliest examples of these theories is lex talionis, or “an eye for an eye.” See Meghan J. 
Ryan, Proximate Retribution, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1049, 1053–59 (2012).  Retributivism in its 
current form became a “legitimate, and even the primary, justification for punishment” in the 
mid-1980s in the United States. See id. at 1057. 
 33. Compare Reisig, supra note 30, at 172–74 (noting the use of rehabilitation in the 
drug court movement), with Kimberly L. Patch, The Sentencing Reform Act:  Reconsidering 
Rehabilitation As a Critical Consideration in Sentencing, 39 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. 
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1.  Utilitarian Theories 
Rehabilitation is a subset of utilitarianism, a category that also includes 
incapacitation and deterrence.34  Utilitarian theory posits that there is a 
balance between improving and punishing the offender, thereby reducing 
recidivism and protecting the public.35  The theory, advocated for by 
philosopher Jeremy Bentham, aims to evaluate a course of conduct by the 
“amount of happiness and suffering that is generated by the conduct.”36  
The theory is forward-looking; an individual’s past criminal acts are largely 
irrelevant in deciding her punishment.37 
The theory of rehabilitation posits that the decision to commit a crime is 
not free will, but rather is determined by various sociological, 
psychological, and biological factors.38  Rehabilitation is premised on the 
notion that punishment should include treatment so that the defendant is 
able return to society “so reformed that he will not desire or need to commit 
further crimes.”39  Drug courts rely on rehabilitation when formulating 
treatment and sentencing regimes.40 
In addition to rehabilitation, utilitarian theories include deterrence and 
incapacitation.  The goal of deterrence is to prevent crime through “actual 
or threatened punishment.”41  Deterrence may be accomplished generally, 
by using society’s awareness of punishment of a crime to deter others from 
committing future offenses,42 and specifically, by deterring a specific 
offender from reoffending.43 
 
CONFINEMENT 165, 182 (2013) (discussing the relationship between the Sentencing Reform 
Act and rehabilitation). 
 34. See Andrew R. Strauss, Losing Sight of the Utilitarian Forest for the Retributivist 
Trees:  An Analysis of the Role of Public Opinion in a Utilitarian Model of Punishment, 23 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1549, 1557 (2002). 
 35. See Paul Gendreau, Rehabilitation:  What Works to Change Offenders, in 
CORRECTIONAL THEORY:  CONTEXT AND CONSEQUENCES 1, 147–50 (Francis T. Cullen & 
Cheryl L. Jonson eds., 2012). 
 36. Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism:  The Injustice of “Just” 
Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 856 (2002); see also JEREMY BENTHAM, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 2 (Batoche Books, 
Kitchener 2000) (1781) (ebook). 
 37. See Strauss, supra note 34, at 1557. 
 38. See David J. Rothman, Correctional Theory in Crisis:  America’s Changing Context, 
in CORRECTIONAL THEORY:  CONTEXT AND CONSEQUENCES, supra note 35, at 23, 25; see also 
Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence:  Scaring Offenders Straight, in CORRECTIONAL THEORY:  
CONTEXT AND CONSEQUENCES, supra note 35, at 67, 73. 
 39. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIM. L. § 1.5 (2d ed. 2014). 
 40. See Reisig, supra note 30. 
 41. John C. Ball, The Deterrence Concept in Criminology and Law, 46 J. CRIM. L. 
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 347, 347 (1955). 
 42. See CAMPBELL, supra note 32, § 2:2.  General deterrence can be accomplished 
through “apparent punishment, even if without actual punishment.” Christopher, supra note 
36, at 857. 
 43. Specific deterrence has received some criticism because there is little evidence of an 
“effect arising from the experience of imprisonment compared with the experience of 
noncustodial sanctions such as probation.” Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First 
Century, 42 CRIME & JUST. 199, 200–05 (2013). 
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Incapacitation theory states that the most effective way to ensure 
someone does not reoffend is to incarcerate or physically isolate her.44  The 
theories of incapacitation and deterrence affect the treatment of addicts in 
the criminal justice system.  For example, deterrence and incapacitation 
have been the underlying justifications for strict sentencing regimes 
implemented in connection with the War on Drugs.45  Deterrence is also 
used as justification for swift sanction programs.46  For example, advocates 
of HOPE theorize that the strict probation requirements and the use of swift 
and immediate sanctions deter probationers from violating the terms of 
probation or reoffending.47 
2.  Retributive Theories 
The Rockefeller Drug Laws reflected another theory of punishment:  
retributivism.48  Many hypothesized that rehabilitation was not 
accomplishing the goals it set out to address.49  Both liberals and 
conservatives blamed rehabilitation for thwarting the goals of punishment.50  
Theorists and criminal justice actors began focusing their attention 
elsewhere, primarily on retributivism as a means to reduce recidivism.51 
The theory of retribution structures sentencing so that individuals receive 
sanctions justified on the grounds that the “offenders deserve it.”52  
 
 44. See Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance:  The Resilience of Retribution As an 
Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1316 (2000). 
 45. For example, the Rockefeller Drug Laws implemented mandatory and indeterminate 
prison terms based on the weight of the drug, placed restrictions on plea bargaining, and 
used mandatory prison sentences for repeat offenders. See Drug Law Changes, N.Y. ST. 
DIVISION CRIM. JUST. SERVS., http://criminaljustice.ny.gov/drug-law-reform/index.html (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/CDL6-PTTJ].  These laws were seen as the logical 
solution to the drug epidemic. See Edward J. Maggio, New York’s Rockefeller Drug Laws, 
Then and Now, 78 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J. 30, 30 (2006) (“The idea behind the new laws was to 
deter criminals and to quarantine users, so the plague of drug addiction could be 
contained.”). 
 46. See infra Part II.C; infra note 263 and accompanying text. 
 47. See ANGELA HAWKEN, AM. PROB. & PAROLE ASS’N, THE MESSAGE FROM HAWAII:  
HOPE FOR PROBATION 40 (2012) (citing “[a] clearly defined behavioral contract” and 
“foreseeable, known consequences” as key reasons for which “the certainty of 
punishment . . . deters future violations” (emphasis omitted)). 
 48. See Timothy Edwards, The Theory and Practice of Compulsory Drug Treatment in 
the Criminal Justice System:  The Wisconsin Experiment, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 283, 290 
(“Anchored by retributive ideals that insist on moral accountability, the once-fashionable 
goal of rehabilitation has been supplanted by an ideological shift that emphasizes 
incapacitation as a core value.”). 
 49. FRANCIS T. CULLEN & KAREN E. GILBERT, REAFFIRMING REHABILITATION 111 (2d ed. 
1983) (“[I]t is the very presence of rehabilitative ideology and practice that is responsible for 
the most debasing features of American corrections . . . .  [S]tate-enforced therapy will 
inevitably foster the abuse of offenders and result in gross inequalities in the administration 
of justice.”). 
 50. See Cullen & Gendreau, supra note 25, at 109 (“Rehabilitation was blamed by 
liberals for allowing the state to act coercively against offenders, and was blamed by 
conservatives for allowing the state to act leniently toward offenders.”). 
 51. See id. 
 52. See Strauss, supra note 34, at 1558 & n.46 (quoting Michael S. Moore, The Moral 
Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS 179, 182 
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Punishment depends on the individual and her past criminal acts; it is not 
concerned with society “or on the possible consequences of the infliction of 
punishment.”53  Retributivism may refer to legalistic retributivism, which 
focuses on law breaking as an indicator for the appropriate punishment, or 
moralistic retributivism, the moral guilt that accompanies particular 
criminal acts, also known as “just deserts.”54 
Because of these conflicting theories of punishment, courts are faced 
with determining how to sentence addicts.  On the one hand, addicts may 
pose costs and dangers to society because of their addiction.55  On the other 
hand, drug court theory “meld[s] substance abuse treatment and 
punishment,” combining theories of punishment looking to rehabilitate the 
offender while maintaining an element of retributive punishment.56  These 
competing theories of punishment have been utilized prior to and 
throughout the creation of drug courts and their progeny.57 
B.  Formulating Policy:  A Brief History 
of Courts’ Struggles with Sentencing Addicts 
The theories discussed in the previous section serve as the basis for 
understanding how and why legislatures and courts have structured 
sentencing policy for addicts.  This section examines the evolution of 
courts’ struggles to appropriately punish drug-addicted defendants while 
maintaining the desire to rehabilitate. 
One of the first efforts to address the issue of sentencing addicts was the 
adoption of “status statutes.”58  For example, California implemented a 
state statute that made it a criminal offense for a person to be “addicted to 
the use of narcotics.”59  Upon review, however, the Supreme Court struck 
down the California statute as a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.60  The Court likened drug addiction to being “mentally ill, or 
a leper, or to be afflicted with a venereal disease.”61  The Court decided that 
 
(Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987)) (“For a retributivist, the moral culpability of an offender 
also gives society the duty to punish.  Retributivism, in other words, is truly a theory of 
justice such that, if it is true, we have an obligation to set up institutions so that retribution is 
achieved.”). 
 53. See Strauss, supra note 34, at 1558–59. 
 54. See id. at 1559–60. 
 55. The National Institute of Drug Abuse estimates that the total overall costs of 
substance abuse in the United States exceed $600 billion annually. DrugFacts:  
Understanding Drug Abuse and Addiction, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, 
http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/understanding-drug-abuse-addiction (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/HP2K-ZB49]. 
 56. Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment Court 
Movement, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1205, 1208 (1998). 
 57. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 58. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11721 (West), repealed by California 
Uniform Controlled Substances Act of 1972, ch. 1407, § 2, p. 2987 (West). 
 59. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 660 n.1 (1962). 
 60. Id. at 667. 
 61. Id. at 666–67. 
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criminalizing the status of “addict,” which it likened to punishing someone 
for having a disease,62 did not merit criminal sanctions.63 
Six years after the invalidation of the California statute, the Court 
revisited the issue of how to treat addicts in criminal cases.64  In Powell v. 
Texas,65 the Court, in a fractured decision, declined to extend its reasoning 
in Robinson v. California66 to include crimes that were committed because 
of alcoholism.67  In Powell, the defendant—who showed clear signs of 
alcoholism—was convicted of public drunkenness under a Texas statute.68  
The defendant challenged the conviction on the grounds that it violated the 
Eighth Amendment.69  In a lengthy opinion, Justice Marshall, writing for 
the plurality,70 discussed the implications of alcoholism and debated 
whether it could be considered a disease.71  The Court ultimately decided 
not to extend Robinson, distinguishing the case by reasoning that it was 
Powell’s choice to be on a public street while drunk.72  The Court reasoned 
that the defendant was punished not for his status as an alcoholic, but for his 
public behavior.73 
In his concurrence, Justice White opined that if it is not a crime to “have 
an irresistible compulsion to use narcotics,” then it cannot “be a crime to 
yield to such a compulsion.”74  Justice White saw no difference between the 
statutes at issue in Powell and Robinson.  However, he voted with the 
majority because he did not think the punishment was cruel and unusual 
under the Eighth Amendment.75 
The dissent in Powell saw this case as nothing more than an extension of 
Robinson.76  Justice Fortas analyzed the question of whether the defendant, 
 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See Eric J. Miller, Embracing Addiction:  Drug Courts and the False Promise of 
Judicial Interventionism, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1479, 1527 (2004) (“The difference between the 
Robinson and Powell opinions consists in their attitude toward penal welfarism and the 
disease model of addiction.”). 
 65. 392 U.S. 514 (1968). 
 66. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
 67. Powell, 392 U.S. at 526. 
 68. Id. at 517. 
 69. Id. at 531–32. 
 70. The decision did not have a majority opinion.  Three justices—Chief Justice Warren, 
Justice Black, and Justice Harlan—voted with the majority opinion written by Justice 
Marshall. Id. at 516–17.  Justice White wrote a separate concurrence. Id. at 548 (White, J., 
concurring).  Justices Stewart, Douglas, and Brennan joined Justice Fortas in a dissent. Id. at 
554 (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
 71. Id. at 522 (majority opinion) (discussing how there is no agreement in the medical 
community on the meaning of alcoholism as a disease). 
 72. Id. at 526 (“[I]t is quite another [thing] to say that a man has a ‘compulsion’ to take a 
drink, but that he also retains a certain amount of ‘free will’ with which to resist.”). 
 73. Id. at 533–34. 
 74. Id. at 548 (White, J., concurring) (“Punishing an addict for using drugs convicts for 
addiction under a different name.  Distinguishing between the two crimes is like forbidding 
criminal conviction for being sick with flu or epilepsy but permitting punishment for running 
a fever or having a convulsion.”). 
 75. Id. at 553–54. 
 76. Id. at 569–70 (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
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who suffered from “chronic alcoholism,” should be subject to a criminal 
penalty when his actions were only “a compulsion symptomatic of the 
disease of chronic alcoholism” and not a matter of free will.77  The dissent 
discussed the history of alcoholism in the United States, contending that, 
because of the nature of the disease, “[i]t is entirely clear that the jailing of 
chronic alcoholics is punishment” and that “there [is no] basis for claiming 
that [serving jail time] is therapeutic (or indeed a deterrent).”78  Justice 
Fortas argued that the use of a criminal penalty in this case was cruel and 
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, and thus the conviction 
should have been overturned.79 
The Court’s analysis of Powell’s “criminal” activity highlights the 
complexity of sentencing alcoholics and drug addicts.  While the plurality 
argued that addiction should not be a get-out-of-jail-free card for offenders, 
the four-justice dissent espoused the idea that the state should not punish 
people for involuntary acts resulting from a “compulsion.”80  The 
disagreement among the justices in Powell represents the pull between 
rehabilitative and retributive values when determining drug treatment 
programs within the criminal justice system.81 
C.  The Creation of Drug Courts 
The previous section discussed the way in which courts sentenced addicts 
prior to the creation of drug courts.  This section examines the 
establishment of drug courts, beginning with judge-operated programs and 
eventually extending into the vast network of state and federal drug courts 
that exists today.82 
In the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Congress tied drugs to drug 
traffickers and terrorists, calling for strict sentences.83  These sentencing 
 
 77. Id. at 558. 
 78. Id. at 564. 
 79. Id. at 570. 
 80. See Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1133 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated on 
other grounds, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[A]s five Justices would later make clear in 
Powell, Robinson also supports the principle that the state cannot punish a person for certain 
conditions, either arising from his own acts or contracted involuntarily, or acts that he is 
powerless to avoid.”). 
 81. See Edwards, supra note 48, at 300 (finding that Powell represents a “complicated 
relationship between medically based, rehabilitative constructs of aberrant behavior and 
competing policy models that are hesitant to incorporate scientific findings into a system that 
emphasizes personal responsibility and just deserts as core values”). 
 82. For an overview of the types and locations of drug courts currently in operation 
across the country, see Types of Drug Courts, NAT’L ASS’N OF DRUG CT. PROFS., 
http://www.nadcp.org/learn/what-are-drug-courts/models (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http:// 
perma.cc/34V3-WGX2]. 
 83. See Pub L. No. 99-570, § 2014, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (finding that “the increased 
cooperation and collaboration between narcotics traffickers and terrorist groups constitutes a 
serious threat to United States national security interests and to the political stability of 
numerous other countries, particularly in Latin America”). 
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parameters were echoed throughout the states84 and led to an increase in the 
prison population as a direct result of drug arrests.85  However, many of the 
defendants incarcerated on drug charges were nonviolent offenders.86 
Some legal scholars became frustrated with the state of drug sentencing, 
and as a result, a movement began in the late 1970s and 1980s calling for an 
alternative to the existing sentencing policy.87  Legal scholars believed that 
criminal dockets were overburdened with drug-related offenses due to the 
“intensification of the war on drugs in the 1980s.”88 
Some judges felt “discomfort” with the restricted sentencing discretion in 
the existing drug laws, which left no room for treatment programs.89  As an 
alternative, Judge Roger J. Kiley of Cook County, Illinois, devised a system 
where he would meet with drug-addicted defendants and probation officers 
from 8:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. in an effort to address addiction more 
directly.90  Similarly, federal Judge Jack B. Weinstein in the Eastern 
District of New York implemented his own program to meet with 
defendants charged with drug-related crimes.91 
In 1989, United States Attorney Janet Reno—then the State’s Attorney of 
Dade County, Florida—and Judge Stanley Goldstein established a 
diversionary treatment program.92  Eleventh Circuit Chief Judge Herbert M. 
Klein was given a one year leave of absence to address the serious and 
“paralyzing” effect of drug offenses in Dade County.93  He studied the ways 
 
 84. The most famous example of the strict state statutes criminalizing drug use and 
possession is the Rockefeller Drug Laws. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 220.00–.65 (McKinney 
2013); see also Maggio, supra note 45. 
 85. By the mid-1990s, drug convictions were the largest and fastest growing category in 
the federal prison population, accounting for 61 percent of the total, compared to 38 percent 
in 1986. See Murphy, supra note 4, at 475. 
 86. Only “21 percent of drug prisoners admitted to state prisons in 1991 had even a 
single incidence of criminal violence in their background.” See id. 
 87. Michael Dorf and Jeffrey Fagan postulate that one of the core reasons for the 
creation of drug courts was “the perception shared by the public and legal elites that the 
crush of drug cases led to a crisis in the courts, characterized by an ineffective system of 
punishment and a ‘revolving door’ that recycled offenders without reducing either their drug 
use or criminality.” Michael C. Dorf & Jeffrey A. Fagan, Problem-Solving Courts:  From 
Innovation to Institutionalization, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1501, 1502 (2003). 
 88. See id. at 1501–02. 
 89. See id. at 1502. 
 90. See Murphy, supra note 4, at 475.  Judge Kiley began this practice in 1976, see id., 
more than ten years prior to the founding of the first official drug court. 
 91. Judge Weinstein explicitly opposed the federal sentencing guidelines that required 
harsh sentences for drug offenders. See Joseph B. Treaster, 2 Judges Decline Drug Cases, 
Protesting Sentencing Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 1993), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/04/17/nyregion/2-judges-decline-drug-cases-protesting-
sentencing-rules.html [http://perma.cc/4TJ8-S2UA].  Because he believed that the guidelines 
emphasized arrests and imprisonment rather than prevention and treatment, Judge Weinstein 
refused to accept drug-related cases to his docket. Id.  Similarly, Judge Robert Sweet in 
Manhattan argued that the sentencing guidelines for prohibiting drugs were “a mistake,” 
saying “[i]t’s not cutting down drug use.  The best way to do this is through education and 
treatment.” Id. 
 92. See Murphy, supra note 4, at 475. 
 93. See 2 GERALD F. UELMEN & ALEX KREIT, HISTORICAL ESTABLISHMENT AND 
DEVELOPMENT, DRUG ABUSE AND THE LAW SOURCEBOOK § 16:1 (2003). 
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in which courts treated low-level drug crimes and found that most addicts 
were not held accountable for their crimes.94  Instead, defendants were 
often arrested, kept in jail for twenty-four hours, and let go on bail.95  The 
same defendants would reappear several weeks later on a new drug-related 
charge.96  Charges would begin to pile up, costing the state or local 
authorities money.97 
In an effort to address this cycle of reoffending, Judge Klein concluded 
that diverting low-level, nonviolent drug offenders to a yearlong treatment 
program would save the state money and could better treat their addiction.98  
The original Dade County Drug Court was founded with the goal of 
processing drug crimes in a cost-effective manner in order to reestablish a 
link between the offender and the community, thereby reducing recidivism 
rates and rehabilitating offenders.99  Drug courts sought to shift the policy 
focus from regulating drug crimes through reducing drugs on the street to 
focusing on treatment of drug addiction.100 
Following the initial success of the Dade County Drug Court, similar 
drug courts opened throughout the country.101  Today, there is at least one 
drug court in each of the fifty states, as well as in the District of Columbia, 
Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and Guam.102  In addition to the 
originally realized general adult drug courts, many states have implemented 
alternatives especially suited for subsets of society—including military 
veterans, Native Americans, and juveniles.103 
In 1997, the National Association of Drug Court Professionals, in 
collaboration with the Bureau of Justice Assistance at the U.S. Department 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See William D. McColl, Comment, Baltimore City’s Drug Treatment Court:  Theory 
and Practice in an Emerging Field, 55 MD. L. REV. 467, 467 (1996). 
 100. See id. 
 101. Ten years after the establishment of the Dade County Drug Court, 492 drug courts 
were operational nationwide. See History, NAT’L ASS’N OF DRUG CT. PROFS, 
http://www.nadcp.org/learn/what-are-drug-courts/drug-court-history (last visited Oct. 21, 
2015) [http://perma.cc/8UK8-QMEB].  As of June 30, 2014, there were 2968 drug courts in 
operation throughout the country. See How Many Drug Courts Are There?, NAT’L DRUG CT. 
RESOURCE CTR., http://www.ndcrc.org/content/how-many-drug-courts-are-there (last visited 
Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/D9VP-3LD6]. 
 102. See SHANNON M. CAREY, ET AL., NPC RESEARCH, EXPLORING THE KEY COMPONENTS 
OF DRUG COURTS:  A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF 18 ADULT DRUG COURTS ON PRACTICES, 
OUTCOMES AND COSTS 1 (2008), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/223853.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/G2Z3-HMQM]. 
 103. In addition to adult drug court programs, Veterans Treatment Court, DWI Court, 
Family Dependency Treatment Court, Federal District Drug Court, Juvenile Drug Court, 
Reentry Court, Reentry Drug Court, Tribal Healing to Wellness Court, and Back on TRAC:  
Treatment, Responsibility, Accountability on Campus have been founded nationwide. See 
Types of Drug Courts, NAT’L ASSOC. OF DRUG CT. PROFS, http://www.nadcp.org/learn/what-
are-drug-courts/types-drug-courts (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/7XTC-E4GU]. 
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of Justice, published Defining Drug Courts:  The Key Components.104  The 
report laid out ten key components that are necessary to consider when 
treating drug addiction.105  These components have served as a guide to the 
creation of alternative drug treatment programs.106 
D.  The First Generation of Drug Courts and How They Work 
Drug courts work to ensure that defendants are accountable to the court 
system while receiving drug treatment.107  They rely on “mentoring and 
monitoring” addicts to help them in “rebuilding their lives.”108  The 
programs combine high-level monitoring with a comprehensive treatment 
program:  judges use rewards and punishments to “condition” defendants to 
be responsible for their actions.109  The first drug courts used two primary 
models—the deferred prosecution model and the post-adjudication 
model.110  Each of these models established eligibility requirements and 
followed a basic treatment model. 
1.  The Deferred Prosecution Model 
In deferred prosecution programs, also known as “pre-adjudication,” if 
the defendant meets the eligibility requirements, she is diverted to the drug 
 
 104. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, DEFINING DRUG COURTS:  THE KEY COMPONENTS 
(1997), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/205621.pdf [http://perma.cc/G6CB-7FTN]. 
 105. The key components are: 
[1] Drug Courts integrate alcohol and other drug treatment services with justice 
system case processing . . . .  [2] Using a nonadversarial approach, prosecution and 
defense counsel promote public safety while protecting participants’ due process 
rights . . . .  [3] Eligible participants are identified early and promptly placed in the 
drug court program . . . .  [4] Drug courts provide access to a continuum of alcohol, 
drug, and other related treatment and rehabilitation services . . . .  [5] Abstinence is 
monitored by frequent alcohol and other drug testing . . . .  [6] A coordinated 
strategy governs drug court responses to participants’ compliance . . . .  [7] 
Ongoing judicial interaction with each drug court participant is essential . . . .  [8] 
Monitoring and evaluation measure the achievement of program goals and gauge 
effectiveness . . . .  [9] Continuing interdisciplinary education promotes effective 
drug court planning, implementation, and operations . . . .  [10] Forging 
partnerships among drug courts, public agencies, and community-based 
organizations generates local support and enhances drug court program 
effectiveness. 
Id. 
 106. See CYNTHIA G. LEE ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., A COMMUNITY COURT GROWS 
IN BROOKLYN:  A COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION OF THE RED HOOK COMMUNITY JUSTICE 
CENTER 2 (2013), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Services%20and%20Experts/ 
Areas%20of%20expertise/Problem%20solving%20courts/11012013-Red-Hook-Final-
Report.ashx (using the key components as a basis for formulating their own list of eleven 
crucial elements for the founding of the Red Hook Community Justice Center) 
[http://perma.cc/RMR8-QTLP]. 
 107. See Dorf & Fagan, supra note 87, at 1502 (noting how drug courts combined 
“popular demand for punitive responses” to the drug problem with notions of individual 
responsibility and treatment). 
 108. Vick & Keating, supra note 6, at 291. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See Murphy, supra note 4, at 476. 
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court before pleading to a charge.111  This model “capitalize[s] on the 
trauma of arrest” to motivate the defendant to immediately enter a treatment 
program.112  If the defendant successfully completes the program, then her 
record of arrest is usually expunged.113  If the defendant does not 
successfully complete the drug court program, however, she is 
prosecuted.114 
There are three underlying approaches in the deferred prosecution model.  
First, in a “diversion” approach, the case is dismissed upon successful 
completion of the program.115  Second, a “pre-diversion” approach requires 
that the individual plead guilty to the charges.116  After successful 
completion, the plea is withdrawn or the case is dismissed.117  Finally, in a 
“stipulated facts” approach, the defendant stipulates to the facts of her case, 
and the charges are dismissed upon successful completion of the 
program.118 
2.  The Post-Adjudication Model 
In the post-adjudication model, the defendant pleads guilty to the 
underlying charge, and the sentence is deferred or suspended while she 
participates in the drug treatment program.119  If she successfully completes 
the program, the sentence is waived and the conviction is often 
expunged.120  This model is considered effective because the judge’s 
consistent monitoring throughout the course of the program gives added 
incentive to the individual to complete treatment.121 
3.  Eligibility Requirements 
Before an addict is diverted to drug court, she must satisfy several 
eligibility requirements.122  Eligibility for drug court programs varies 
depending on the jurisdiction.123  Generally, courts look to the severity of 
the charges,124 the type of charges, the defendant’s criminal history, and 
 
 111. See id. 
 112. See id. 
 113. See HUDDLESTON & MARLOWE, supra note 12, at 24. 
 114. See Murphy, supra note 4, at 476. 
 115. See id. 
 116. See id. 
 117. See id. 
 118. See id. 
 119. See id. 
 120. See id. 
 121. See id. (“The post adjudication model is successful only if there is pre-trial 
monitoring of the defendant from the time of arrest.”). 
 122. See REMPEL ET AL., supra note 13, at 14. 
 123. Compare id. at 13–16 (describing New York State’s eligibility requirements), with 
STATE OF N.J., MANUAL FOR OPERATION OF ADULT DRUG COURTS IN NEW JERSEY 10–12 
(2002), https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/drugcourt/dctman.pdf (stating the eligibility 
requirements for New Jersey drug courts) [http://perma.cc/JH66-3QX9]. 
 124. See REMPEL ET AL., supra note 13, at 14. 
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previous probation violations.125  Additionally, the defendant must have an 
established alcohol or drug dependency.126  Some programs require that 
individuals with a history of violent crimes be automatically excluded.127 
Eligible defendants spend an average of twelve to eighteen months in 
drug treatment, during which time the defendant is randomly drug tested on 
a regular basis.128  The judge reviews the progress of the individual, who 
may only graduate after continuous abstention from drugs and alcohol.129  
If an individual fails a random drug test, she will be sanctioned, sometimes 
resulting in jail time or community service.130  A defendant may be 
terminated from the program if the court determines that she is not 
benefitting from treatment or if she commits another crime while 
enrolled.131 
4.  The Basic Treatment Program in Traditional Drug Courts 
While the treatment program utilized by each traditional drug court 
varies, most models follow a similar approach to medical treatment.  The 
Miami-Dade Drug Court provides a useful example for understanding a 
version of the basic approach to medical treatment.132  There, each offender 
must complete a three-step program to graduate.133  Phase I, 
“detoxification,” seeks to end chemical dependency on drugs.134  If the 
individual requires detoxification, the court transfers her to an independent 
treatment provider, where an individualized treatment plan is created.135 
During Phase II, the individual continues to attend counseling, but is no 
longer in residential treatment.136  The individual structures her own 
 
 125. For example, many drug courts prohibit eligibility if the defendant is charged with a 
violent crime. See id. 
 126. See RYAN S. KING & JILL PASQUARELLA, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, DRUG COURTS:  
A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 1 (2009), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/dp_ 
drugcourts.pdf [http://perma.cc/D522-2CWG]. 
 127. In order to receive federal funding for drug court programs, the jurisdiction must 
exclude violent offenders. See 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations 
Authorizations Act, Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 2952, 116 Stat. 1758 (2002) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 128. See HUDDLESTON & MARLOWE, supra note 12, at 7. 
 129. See id. 
 130. See id. 
 131. For example, California requires an individual’s termination from the drug court 
program and the reinstatement of criminal charges if 
the court finds that (1) the defendant is not performing satisfactorily in the 
assigned program, (2) the defendant is not benefiting from education, treatment, or 
rehabilitation, (3) the defendant has been convicted of a crime specified . . . or (4) 
the defendant has engaged in criminal conduct rendering him or her unsuitable for 
the preguilty plea program. 
5 EDWARD A. RUCKER & MARK E. OVERLAND, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PRACTICE:  MOTIONS, 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND SENTENCING § 53:8, Weslaw (database updated Sept. 2015) (citing 
Cal. Penal Code §§ 1000.3–.5(b)). 
 132. See supra Part I.C. 
 133. See Hora et al., supra note 5, at 482. 
 134. See id. 
 135. See id. 
 136. See id. at 483. 
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treatment program while the judge monitors her progress.137  This phase 
lasts for about fourteen to sixteen weeks.138  If the defendant regresses, the 
judge may send her back through Phase I.139 
Finally, the individual moves to the “aftercare” stage in Phase III.140  
Here, the individual is introduced to “academic and occupational 
preparation for a new type of life style.”141  The individual continues to 
provide the court with urine samples to be tested for drugs and is 
encouraged to maintain sobriety without the supervision of the court.142  
This phase often lasts for about thirty-six weeks and contains the same 
caveat as Phase II that if the individual fails or regresses at any point, she is 
recycled through the earlier phases.143 
The individual makes one final court appearance after the completion of 
all three steps, at which point the charges are dismissed and the individual 
graduates from the program.144  Twelve months after the successful 
completion of the entire program, the court seals all records related to the 
arrest.145 
5.  Criticisms of Traditional Drug Courts 
Many scholars and criminal justice actors saw drug courts as the “magic 
solution” to America’s drug problem.146  However, the newly formed courts 
received—and continue to receive—criticism from various vantage 
points.147  Some criticize drug courts from a treatment perspective.148  They 
claim that because addiction is a disease, it is impossible to determine how 
many times a defendant fails an element of treatment before she is 
terminated from the program and subjected to criminal sanctions, making 
the process “arbitrary.”149  These critics question why the criminal justice 
system is involved at all in the treatment of a disease.150 
A second criticism comes from defense attorneys, who find their place 
within the drug court system inconsistent with traditional notions of 
 
 137. See id. 
 138. See id. 
 139. See id. 
 140. See id. 
 141. See id. 
 142. See id. at 484. 
 143. See id. 
 144. See id.  In a drug court context, “graduation” refers to a successful completion of the 
treatment program. See id. at 485. 
 145. See id. at 484. 
 146. Morris B. Hoffman, The Drug Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1437, 1475 (2000). 
 147. See generally Miller, supra note 64.  For a more detailed look at criticisms of drug 
courts, see, for example, Goldkamp, supra note 29; Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team Am I on 
Anyway?  Musings of a Public Defender About Drug Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 37, 53–59 (2001). 
 148. See Hoffman, supra note 146, at 1475. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. (“If drug addiction is truly a disease that manifests itself in uncontrollable 
behavior until treated, why is the criminal law involved at all as a backup to failed 
treatment?”). 
872 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
defense.151  In criminal court, defense attorneys are advocates for the 
defendant; their job is to get their client a favorable outcome.152  In drug 
courts, however, this role becomes more difficult with the additional 
treatment element in sentencing.153  Some defense attorneys believe that the 
pressure for defendants to enroll in a treatment plan is quite strong, 
sometimes requiring the defendant to plead guilty when they otherwise 
would not have.154  Additionally, the contours of due process rights a 
defendant waives when accepting guilty pleas conditioned on treatment are 
unclear, which is disconcerting to defense attorneys.155 
Finally, some believe that returning to rehabilitative ideals is misguided 
and imprudent.156  These critics posit that “the emergence of drug courts 
[is] a nostalgic yearning for the idealism of an earlier decade . . . that never 
really existed.”157  They believe that the turn toward more punitive 
sentencing in the 1970s was for good reason and was meant to address the 
ineffectiveness158 of a rehabilitative approach.159  Critics of the drug court 
movement advocate for “pulling back on the reigns” so that the programs 
may be evaluated and modified as necessary.160 
II.  ALTERNATIVE DRUG TREATMENT PROGRAMS 
In an effort to address some of the criticisms set forth in the previous 
part, some jurisdictions have created alternative drug treatment 
programs.161  This part addresses several models that have emerged as an 
alternative to traditional drug courts.  First, this part discusses community 
 
 151. See generally Quinn, supra note 147. 
 152. See Peggy Fulton Hora & Theodore Stalcup, Drug Treatment Courts in the Twenty-
First Century:  The Evolution of the Revolution in Problem-Solving Courts, 42 GA. L. REV. 
717, 792 (2008). 
 153. See Quinn, supra note 147, at 59. 
 154. See id. (noting the difficult choice defense attorneys have in counseling their clients 
when their choice is between fighting their innocence behind bars or accepting a guilty plea). 
 155. See id. at 54–55. 
 156. See Goldkamp, supra note 29, at 926; see also Boldt, supra note 56, at 1217 (noting 
that “treatment court officials place relatively greater emphasis on rehabilitative services 
than do most other actors in the traditional criminal justice system”). 
 157. Goldkamp, supra note 29, at 926. 
 158. Francis T. Cullen articulated three widely adopted criticisms of rehabilitation as a 
theory of punishment that led to its decline. Cullen, supra note 26, at 317.  First, prisons are 
more concerned with maintaining control than therapeutic ideals, rendering rehabilitation 
while incarcerated obsolete. Id.  Second, abuse of discretion of who receives treatment and 
who goes to prison leads to arbitrary and even unjust decisions. Id. at 318.  Finally, some 
critics believe that if treatment is coerced through the courts, it is never truly effective. Id. at 
318–19. 
 159. See Anthony C. Thompson, Courting Disorder:  Some Thoughts on Community 
Courts, 10 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 63, 76 (2002). (recognizing the “disappointing lessons, 
abuses, and poor track record of rehabilitation policies that preceded the shift toward the 
more punitive justice aims in recent decades”). 
 160. See Quinn, supra note 147, at 74. 
 161. See Victoria Malkin, Community Courts and the Process of Accountability:  
Consensus and Conflict at the Red Hook Community Justice Center, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1573, 1573 (2003) (“They have been proposed as a new version of justice—one that makes 
justice swift, visible and accountable, and thereby bridges the gap between communities and 
courts.”). 
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courts, specifically, the Red Hook Community Justice Center (RHCJC) in 
Brooklyn, New York, which incorporates community involvement with 
drug treatment.162  Then, this part explores community-panel courts, such 
as the Woodbury County Community Drug Court (“the WCC Court”) in 
Iowa, which replaces the role of the judge with members of the 
community.163  Finally, this part addresses swift sanction probation 
programs, such as HOPE.164  These three programs use different policies 
and procedural models to address issues surrounding sentencing and 
treating addicts. 
A.  Red Hook Community Justice Center 
Community courts were first founded with the goal of incorporating 
community involvement in the criminal justice system.165  They seek to 
ameliorate perceived problems in the criminal justice system in three 
ways.166  First, community courts strive to bring “citizens and defendants 
closer in a jurisprudential process that is both therapeutic and 
accountable.”167  The courts are often multijurisdictional, placing various 
aspects of the justice system—such as family court, criminal court, and 
drug court—under “one administrative umbrella.”168  Second, the courts 
focus on “social and behavioral origins of the problems” experienced by 
their participants.169  Finally, community courts bring social services to the 
community to which they may not have had access previously.170 
The RHCJC relies, in part, on the “Broken Windows” theory.171  The 
Broken Windows theory is “an outgrowth of deterrence theory” and 
promotes the idea that “the presence of minor crime and other visible 
conditions of disorder sends a signal to potential lawbreakers that any 
crimes they commit are likely to be overlooked.”172  The theory argues that 
one way to lower crime rates is to prosecute low-level crimes.173  By 
monitoring crimes that make a neighborhood seem “rundown,” it sends a 
 
 162. See infra Part II.A. 
 163. See infra Part II.B. 
 164. See infra Part II.C. 
 165. See Malkin, supra note 161, at 1573 (noting the “explicit incorporation of the 
community into the judicial process as a way to improve the justice system and empower 
local communities”). 
 166. See Jeffrey Fagan & Victoria Malkin, Theorizing Community Justice Through 
Community Courts, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 897, 898 (2003). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id.; see also Thompson, supra note 159, at 64. 
 169. See Fagan & Malkin, supra note 166, at 898. 
 170. See id. 
 171. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 66–67 (“In accordance with the broken windows 
theory, community courts typically focus on cleaning up minor ‘quality of life’ crimes . . . on 
the assumption that this will lead to reductions in other types of crime as well.”). 
 172. Id. at 6. 
 173. See George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows:  The Police and 
Neighborhood Safety, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 1982), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/ 
archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/?single_page=true (“[D]isorder and crime are 
usually inextricably linked, in a kind of developmental sequence.”) [http://perma.cc/H94U-
Z8TT]. 
874 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
signal to the community that the police are maintaining order, which 
engenders “relie[f] and reasurr[ance].”174  As an outgrowth of Broken 
Windows, RHCJC is “designed to permit the community—and the court—
to regain authority over conduct that threatens the community’s safety and 
economic viability.”175  In so doing, some community courts prosecute 
primarily low-level misdemeanors and violations, leaving violent and 
felony offenders to the purview of the traditional criminal court system.176 
The RHCJC was the nation’s first multijurisdictional community 
court.177  Prior to the RHCJC’s creation, the neighborhood of Red Hook, 
Brooklyn, had a predominantly poor population178 and was a “hotbed of 
crime.”179  The issues in the neighborhood, however, were not just centered 
around the violence, but also the deep mistrust of local law enforcement and 
its geographical isolation.180  The RHCJC was founded following drug-
related violence in Red Hook’s public housing complexes.181  The 
community court officially opened its doors in April 2000.182 
 
 174. Id. (noting that if police do not monitor low-level crimes, such as “window 
breaking,” then “one unrepaired broken window is a signal that no one cares, and so 
breaking more windows costs nothing”). 
 175. Thompson, supra note 159, at 66–67. 
 176. See id. at 66.  It should be noted that the Broken Windows theory has received 
criticism for its focus on low-level crimes.  It is argued that this method of policing 
disproportionately affects poor and minority individuals. See Steve Zeidman, Is ‘Broken 
Windows’ Broken?  Yes, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 3, 2014), http://www.nydailynews.com/ 
opinion/broken-windows-broken-yes-article-1.1889011 (“Data show that a relative few zip 
codes in majority black and Latino neighborhoods are home to more than half of the 
arrestees in NYC.”) [http://perma.cc/3CHV-56TB]; see also Justin Peters, Broken Windows 
Policing Doesn’t Work, SLATE (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_ 
politics/crime/2014/12/broken_windows_policing_doesn_t_work_it_also_may_have_killed_
eric_garner.html [http://perma.cc/R8RQ-ZXY3]. 
 177. See Red Hook Community Justice Center, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, 
http://www.courtinnovation.org/project/red-hook-community-justice-center (last visited Oct. 
21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/8S4D-54XK].  One judge—currently Judge Alex Calabrese—
oversees all criminal and civil cases at the RHCJC. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 36.  
The RHCJC also houses a court attorney, a court clerk’s office, a resource coordinator, court 
officers, a court reporter and interpreter, personnel from the Center for Court Innovation, an 
alternative sanctions office, and members from various partner organizations, including the 
District Attorney’s office, Legal Aid defense attorneys, and police precincts. Id. at 36–39. 
 178. The median income in the neighborhood in 1990 was $9500 per person, which was 
less than one-third of the median for New York City as a whole. See LEE ET AL., supra note 
106, at 23.  Over 30 percent of the neighborhood’s working age men were unemployed and 
78 percent of children in the neighborhood were being raised by a single parent. Id. 
 179. As quoted in the 1988 Life Magazine cover story, Red Hook had frequent shootouts 
between rival gangs and drug dealers, and the author described the neighborhood by saying 
“[t]here is a shooting every night and sometimes two . . . .  It’s like Dodge City.” Id. at 23 
(quoting Edward Barnes & George Howe Colt, Crack:  Downfall of a Neighborhood, LIFE, 
July 1988, at 100). 
 180. See Fagan & Malkin, supra note 166, at 899 (citing the neighborhood’s crisis as 
partly the result of “the low rating by citizens of the legitimacy of law and legal 
institutions”). 
 181. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 25.  Today, approximately 8000 of 11,000 
residents in Red Hook live in the neighborhood’s housing projects, the Red Hook Houses. 
See Fagan & Malkin, supra note 166, at 914. 
 182. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 1.  The RHCJC was founded on the tenet of six 
distinguishing features of community courts:  (i) individualized justice, (ii) expanded 
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RHCJC has three primary features.  First, the court system utilizes 
deterrence as a theory of punishment, looking to ensure that there is a 
“certainty of meaningful punishment—including follow-up sanctions in 
response to a defendant’s noncompliance with the original court order.”183  
To accomplish this, judges require that defendants appear in court on a 
regular basis to demonstrate compliance with the programs.184  Second, 
RHCJC’s founders believed that intervention targeting the root problem of 
an offender’s behavior is crucial to rehabilitation.185  As part of this 
“intervention” stage, RHCJC employs drug treatment programs, social 
services, and other community-based programs to engender positive change 
in an offenders’ behavior.186  Finally, RHCJC uses procedural justice to 
mend the distrust between people in the community and law 
enforcement.187  The system looks to stimulate “voluntary compliance with 
the law by enhancing the perceived legitimacy . . . in judicial decision-
making as well as the cultivation of close ties to the community.”188 
RHCJC’s model allows for greater discretion when deciding whether to 
divert a defendant to drug treatment.189  In traditional drug courts, 
defendants who have a violent criminal history are often not eligible for 
treatment.190  Community courts, however, have greater discretion in 
determining each defendant’s sentence or treatment.191  Because RHCJC 
diverts defendants from various backgrounds to drug treatment, the 
 
sentencing options, (iii) varying mandate length, (iv) offender accountability, (v) community 
engagement, and (iv) community impacts. See id. at 3–4; see also Malkin, supra note 161, at 
1578 (citing four main issues on which the founders of the RHCJC relied, including social 
services for defendants and residents, resources for young people, participation in local 
community service projects, and “the court’s ability to help the community improve public 
safety”). 
 183. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 4–5. 
 184. See id. 
 185. See id. at 6–7. 
 186. See id. (“By treating the underlying addiction rather than merely punishing the 
offender for the resulting crime, the Justice Center aims to break the cycle of recurrent 
criminal behavior caused by drug addiction.”).  The “intervention” methods available to the 
court include drug treatment programs, job training, GED classes, computer labs, medical 
examinations, mental health counseling, and family services. See Alex Calabrese, “Team 
Red Hook” Addresses Wide Range of Community Needs, 72 N.Y. ST. B. J. 14, 14, 16 (2000). 
 187. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 7–9. 
 188. Id. at 4–5; see also Fagan & Malkin, supra note 166, at 900 (“The creation of a court 
physically closer to the community, more responsive to the problems that give rise to crime, 
and accountable to the community to reduce crime and deliver remedial services, offers the 
Court a transformative role that will involve citizens in the processes of social regulation and 
control that are essential to crime prevention and justice.”). 
 189. See AUBREY FOX, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, A TALE OF THREE CITIES:  DRUGS, 
COURTS AND COMMUNITY JUSTICE 4–5 (2010), http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/ 
default/files/Tale_3_Cities.pdf (“There are a number of people . . . who wouldn’t be eligible 
for drug court given their criminal history.”) [http://perma.cc/AU7Z-HRBB]. 
 190. See id. at 4. 
 191. See id. at 5. 
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programs are more varied than traditional drug courts in substance and 
length.192 
Procedurally, the defendant and defense attorney consent to a clinic staff 
member making an assessment to determine whether she has committed the 
crime as a result of addiction.193  Clinic staff look to identify a variety of 
possible symptoms, including addiction, psychological trauma, brain injury, 
and mental illness.194  The assessment consists of extensive questioning and 
a urine test.195  The clinic gives an individualized recommendation tailored 
to the defendant and her particular treatment needs.196 
With this assessment in hand, the prosecutor decides whether to charge 
the defendant or divert her to a treatment program.197  The prosecutor and 
judge are free to alter the suggested treatment plan at their discretion.198  
Once the treatment plan is formulated, the defendant may choose to plead 
guilty, with the agreement that upon successful completion of the program, 
an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD) will be entered.199  
The judge has the discretion in more serious cases—those that would 
traditionally call for incarceration—to enter a conviction, with treatment as 
a condition thereof.200 
RHCJC works with external providers to assist with providing treatment 
to defendants.201  Health insurance often plays a role in matching a 
defendant with a provider because RHCJC does not fund treatment.202  
During the course of the treatment, the court consistently monitors the 
defendant.203  The clinic also ensures that the defendant fulfills other 
requirements of her sentence.204  This monitoring stage includes consistent 
interaction with the clinic; staff members meet in groups to analyze the 
defendant’s progress.205 
Staff members attend weekly meetings to discuss individuals who may 
not be complying with the program requirements.206  The group focuses on 
 
 192. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 94.  While the RHCJC allows for varied 
sentences, it may also lead to “the potential for similarly situated defendants to receive 
dissimilar sanctions.” Id. at 96. 
 193. See id. at 90, 95–96. 
 194. See id. 
 195. See id. 
 196. See Fagan & Malkin, supra note 166, at 927 (“As a referral service, however, the 
treatment clinic functions well, catering to individual addicts and their needs.”). 
 197. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 91. 
 198. See id. 
 199. See id.  An ACD allows the defendant to avoid a criminal conviction and its 
potential collateral consequences. Id. 
 200. See id. 
 201. See id. at 92 n.25. 
 202. See id. at 92.  While many defendants in the RHCJC have Medicaid, others who are 
ineligible, including undocumented immigrants, may not be able to receive certain services 
such as methadone treatment for heroin addiction, mental health treatment, or the diagnosis 
of a traumatic brain injury. Id. 
 203. See id. at 93. 
 204. See id. 
 205. See id. 
 206. See id.  The judge, the RHCJC project director and deputy director, the clinical 
coordinator, the resource coordinator, the alternative sanctions coordinator, assistant District 
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defendants who have had attendance problems, failed a drug test, or 
otherwise failed to meet a sentencing requirement.207  The group makes no 
decisions regarding the defendant’s status in the program, as the policy 
dictates that the court hears the defendant’s side of the story.208 
Defendants usually attend court on the Thursday or Friday following the 
list meetings.209  The judge meets with each defendant to discuss her 
status.210  Beyond these formal meetings, the small size of the building 
provides defendants with consistent interaction with court staff.211  There 
are no formal guidelines for sanctions if a defendant fails an aspect of the 
treatment program,212 allowing the judge to punish the defendants on a 
case-by-case basis.213  Typical sanctions include writing an essay on the 
merits of staying clean and community service.214 
RHCJC provides prevention programs that target addiction before the 
conviction of a crime.215  For example, RHCJC created the Red Hook 
Public Safety Corps, which utilizes AmeriCorps volunteers and local 
community members to assist with service projects, including painting over 
graffiti, cleaning parks, and tutoring.216  The center also operates youth 
programs, including sports teams, development programs such as a youth 
court—where kids are taught how to mentor their peers in real world 
cases—and a variety of technical and artistic classes.217 
RHCJC’s approach has raised some concerns when compared to other 
drug court programs.  First, RHCJC’s informal atmosphere is contrary to a 
“traditional legal perspective.”218  Additionally, more consistent and strict 
sanctions than those utilized at RHCJC for noncompliance may provide 
stronger incentives for defendants to stay clean.219  For example, the 
Misdemeanor Brooklyn Treatment Court—a traditional drug court—
specifically lays out the potential jail sentences that the defendant will incur 
if she fails a drug test.220  Conversely, RHCJC’s case-by-case method may 
 
Attorneys, and Legal Aid defense attorneys attend these meetings, which are called “list 
meeting[s].” Id. 
 207. See id. 
 208. See id. 
 209. See id. 
 210. See Malkin, supra note 161, at 1579. 
 211. See id. 
 212. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 94.  This stands in stark contrast to the HOPE 
Program, which has clearly defined sanctions that are implemented regardless of the reason 
for noncompliance. See infra Part II.C. 
 213. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 94. 
 214. See id. 
 215. See FOX, supra note 189, at 5. 
 216. See id. 
 217. See id. 
 218. Malkin, supra note 161, at 1579–80 (describing the way in which court staff share 
information with one another may raise “some concern that the meetings . . . allow 
information detrimental to [the defense lawyer’s] clients’ interests to be revealed to the 
judge”). 
 219. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 96; see also supra notes 212–14 and 
accompanying text. 
 220. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 95. 
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allow for the judge to take into account “legally irrelevant factors” when 
sanctioning, potentially raising due process concerns.221  The sentencing 
hearings that are required for all defendants who fail a stage in their 
treatment, however, may assuage due process concerns.222 
B.  Community Court with a Twist:  
The Woodbury County Community Drug Court 
A second model that has emerged as a means of treating addicts within 
the court system is the community-panel drug court, where trained 
volunteers conduct hearings and render sentencing decisions.223  These 
panels are given similar authority to judges and can administer sanctions 
and rewards to program participants.224  A district court judge oversees the 
program, but defendants only appear before the judge on the panel’s 
recommendation.225  The panel, however, usually has the ability to send an 
individual to jail for one to three days without seeing the judge.226  
Generally, a community-panel court has four to eight panels, each 
consisting of four to six community members, serving on a rotating 
basis.227  The panel members come from a variety of professions,228 and 
several are recovering addicts.229 
Woodbury County Community Drug Court opened in July 1999.230  
After seeing the pervasive problems within their community of rampant 
drug use and corresponding low-level crimes, practitioners in Woodbury 
County approached the judiciary with the hope of founding a drug court.231  
However, due to a lack of available judges to assist, the committee had to 
 
 221. See id. at 96 (noting that the judge may “feel a personal stake” in the defendant’s 
case, leading to varying sanctioning); see also Fagan & Malkin, supra note 166, at 928 (“For 
some, the trade-off of due process rights for treatment, implicit in the therapeutic court 
model, is seen as a threat to delegitimize the new Court.”). 
 222. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 96; see also infra notes 441–42 and accompanying 
text. 
 223. KRISTEN WHITE ET AL., THE IOWA CONSORTIUM FOR SUBSTANCE ABUSE RESEARCH 
AND EVALUATION, DRUG COURT PROCESS EVALUATION REPORT 3 (2008), http://iconsortium. 
subst-abuse.uiowa.edu/downloads/other/DrugCourtProcessEvaluation.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
QSN2-8LCC]. 
 224. See id. 
 225. See id.  If the panel recommends that an individual receive jail time or that his status 
or probation be revoked, he appears before the judge to carry out the sanction. See id. 
 226. See id. 
 227. See id. 
 228. The list of professions that volunteer at community panel drug courts includes 
teachers, principals, small business owners, nurses, barbers, computer technicians, reporters, 
farmers, tattoo artists, motorcycle mechanics, and homemakers. See id. at 4. 
 229. See id. 
 230. See Vick & Keating, supra note 6, at 296.  The WCC Court’s mission statement 
reads:  “To demonstrate an innovative, comprehensive, and integrated approach to substance 
abuse treatment among offending juveniles and adults by coupling the coercive power of the 
court with substance abuse services.” Dwight Vick, Impact of Community-Panel Juvenile 
Drug Court Judges in Woodbury County, Iowa, 1 POL. BUREAUCRACY & JUST. 20, 21 (2009). 
 231. See Vick & Keating, supra note 6, at 295–96. 
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find a creative solution.232  The WCC Court’s goal is to be a “last stop” to 
rehabilitation while reducing incarceration costs and judges’ caseloads.233 
The WCC Court uses a model similar to traditional drug courts.234  
Eligible defendants are diverted to an alternative program focused on 
treatment in lieu of incarceration.235  The decision makers are made up of a 
four-person panel, with district court Judge John Ackerman serving as the 
overseeing judge.236  This model decreases the role of the judge and “places 
an emphasis on the relationships that are developed between the client and 
the panelists, which in turn creates a higher level of accountability between 
the client and the community.”237 
To be eligible for the program, an individual must have an underlying 
substance abuse issue as evidenced from the complaint or charging 
instrument in her case.238  A drug court officer then administers the 
Substance Abuse Subtle Screening Inventory to the individual, a test used 
to determine whether someone has a chemical dependency.239  If the 
individual meets the eligibility requirements, she is assigned a “home” drug 
court panel “based upon interest, learning style, needs and the ‘style’ of the 
panel.”240 
To graduate from the WCC Court, an individual must complete four 
phases.241  First, the defendant must “stabiliz[e].”242  In doing so, the 
participant must establish a treatment plan approved by the panel, agree to 
randomized drug testing, break ties with friends or family who use drugs, 
attend Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) or Narcotics Anonymous (NA) 
meetings, and acknowledge the need for recovery.243  Second, the 
participant must complete the “acceptance” phase, where she must maintain 
the above activities, find a sponsor in her recovery, and complete 
community service, if necessary.244  The third phase, known as 
“maintenance/aftercare,” lasts for approximately three to six months.245  
 
 232. See id. 
 233. See Vick, supra note 230, at 33.  As of 2007, the court had treated 270 clients since 
its inception, about 164 of which were juveniles. See Vick & Keating, supra note 6, at 297. 
 234. See Vick & Keating, supra note 6, at 297–98. 
 235. See id. 
 236. See WHITE ET AL., supra note 223, at 21. 
 237. Vick & Keating, supra note 6, at 296. 
 238. See id. at 297. 
 239. See id.; About the SASSI Institute, THE SASSI INST., https://www.sassi.com/about-us/ 
(last visited Oct. 21, 2015) (stating that “the SASSI Institute is committed to helping people 
who suffer from alcohol and other drug problems and the professionals who serve them”) 
[http://perma.cc/TU36-LKWN]. 
 240. See Vick & Keating, supra note 6, at 298. 
 241. See id. 
 242. See id. 
 243. See id.; MICHAEL F. NERNEY & ROBIN WRIGHT, OJP COURT CLEARINGHOUSE & 
TECH. ASSISTANCE PROJECT, AM. UNIV., REVIEW OF THE WOODBURY COUNTY (SIOUX CITY, 
IOWA) JUVENILE COMMUNITY DRUG COURT PROGRAM WITH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
IMPROVING OPERATIONS AND ADOLESCENT TREATMENT SERVICES 5–6 (2002), http://jpo.wrlc. 
org/bitstream/handle/11204/3332/1358.pdf?sequence=1 [http://perma.cc/262A-5UUR]. 
 244. See NERNEY & WRIGHT, supra note 243, at 6–7. 
 245. See id. at 7. 
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This phase encourages participants to find employment, develop a plan for 
the future, and participate in a “leisure and relapse plan.”246  At the 
completion of phase three, the participant graduates.247  The final phase, 
entitled “recovery,” is meant to be “continuing and ongoing” after the 
individual graduates from the program.248 
The program provides various incentives and sanctions to encourage the 
participants to stay clean.249  Incentives include verbal praise and applause, 
certificates for the completion of each phase, a reduction in community 
service hours, phase advancement, and a reduction in court costs.250  If a 
participant fails a drug test or another prong of treatment, sanctions range 
from having to make up missed appointments or assignments to increased 
testing, placement in detention, placement in an inpatient treatment facility, 
and complete termination from the program.251 
The Gordon Recovery Center252 provides the treatment services, and they 
are largely paid for by the managed care agency in Iowa.253  If the program 
is not covered by the Iowa state agency, then Medicaid, private insurance, 
or family members pay for the services.254 
Some have suggested that community panels have several advantages 
that may be preferable to recovering addicts.255  First, because defendants 
report directly to community members, they may feel that there is an aspect 
of accountability that is absent in a judge-administered program.256  
Additionally, panel members volunteer their time to the program without 
pay, which may indicate to participants that panel members care about 
treating others, not that they are there because they are required to be.257  
Finally, because volunteers—including former addicts—come from all 
professions and positions in the community, the defendant may be more 
likely to listen to someone with whom they can relate.258 
 
 246. Id. 
 247. See id. at 7–8.  To graduate, the individual must have, at a minimum, twelve months 
in the program, six months sober, consistently attended at AA or NA meetings, attended 
group and individual sessions, completed community service, and paid any fines. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. See id. at 8–9. 
 250. See id. at 9. 
 251. See id. at 8–9. 
 252. The Gordon Recovery Center is part of the Jackson Recovery Centers, a privately 
owned chain of treatment facilities located throughout Iowa. See About Us, JACKSON 
RECOVERY CTRS., http://www.gordonrecovery.com/aboutus.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) 
[http://perma.cc/PK7F-YSR4]. 
 253. See NERNEY & WRIGHT, supra note 243, at 10. 
 254. For a more detailed discussion on the interaction between insurance companies, 
managed care systems, and drug courts, see ROBERT V. WOLF, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, 
DRUG TREATMENT, MANAGED CARE AND THE COURTS:  FROM CONFLICT TO COLLABORATION 
(2004), http://www.courtinnovation.org/pdf/managed_care.pdf [http://perma.cc/F6H5-
7JRH]. 
 255. See WHITE ET AL., supra note 223, at 5 (“The presence of volunteers from the 
community also may provide clients with a sense that members of the community care about 
them and take a personal interest in their well-being.”). 
 256. See id. 
 257. See id. 
 258. See id. at 4–5. 
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C.  Hawaii’s Opportunity Probation with Enforcement 
While some jurisdictions work toward lowering drug crimes through 
treatment, such as the RHCJC and the WCC Court, others use probation 
and swift sanction programs to target addiction.  In 2004, Judge Steven Alm 
in Honolulu launched HOPE, targeting drug addicts through probation.259  
HOPE’s goal is to lower recidivism rates while rehabilitating addicts by 
implementing “swift, predictable, and immediate sanctions” each time they 
violate the terms of the program.260  With reports of high success rates, both 
Washington and California have adopted similar systems.261 
Judge Alm incorporated the theory of deterrence into his probation 
program.262  His basic theory was that “the threat of a mild punishment 
imposed reliably and immediately has a much greater deterrent effect than 
the threat of a severe punishment that is delayed and uncertain.”263  Judge 
Alm also integrated theories of behavioral economics into his program.264 
Unlike other drug treatment programs, HOPE is focused on remedying 
the negative implications of the parole system.265  Probation violations have 
accounted for more than half of the prison population growth since 1990.266  
Judges usually have broad discretion to determine the parameters of 
defendants’ probation, including random drug testing.267  Generally, 
however, the consequences of breaking parole occur far later than the actual 
violation.268  Instead, Judge Alm considered it necessary to provide swift 
and consistent sanctions upon a violation of a term of a defendant’s 
 
 259. HOPE Probation, HAWAII’S ST. JUDICIARY, http://www.courts.state.hi.us/special_ 
projects/hope/about_hope_probation.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/5B6F-
YV38].  The original pilot program targeted not only those convicted of drug-related 
offenses, but also sex offenders and domestic violence probationers. See ANGELA HAWKEN & 
MARK KLEIMAN, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, MANAGING DRUG INVOLVED PROBATIONERS WITH 
SWIFT AND CERTAIN SANCTIONS:  EVALUATING HAWAII’S HOPE 8 n.1 (2009), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/229023.pdf [http://perma.cc/H3EN-96YU]. 
 260. HOPE Probation, supra note 259. 
 261. Some accounts predict that HOPE has reduced drug use by more than 80 percent and 
days behind bars by more than 50 percent. See Mark A.R. Kleiman, Jonathan P. Caulkins & 
Angela Hawken, Rethinking the War on Drugs, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 22, 2012), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303425504577353754196169014 [http:// 
perma.cc/F28C-NEJ4]. 
 262. See HAWKEN & KLEIMAN, supra note 259, at 7 (“Delivering relatively modest 
sanctions swiftly and consistently is . . . likely to be both more effective and less cruel than 
sporadically lowering the boom.”). 
 263. Jeffrey Rosen, Prisoners of Parole, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/10/magazine/10prisons-t.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all& 
[http://perma.cc/3RSQ-XBAN]. 
 264. See id.  In his article, Rosen reports that behavioral economists believe that “people 
are more sensitive to the immediate than the slightly deferred future and focus more on how 
likely an outcome is than how bad it is.” Id.  Therefore, probationers may be more likely to 
comply with immediate consequences. See id. 
 265. See HAWKEN & KLEIMAN, supra note 259, at 9. 
 266. See id. at 7. 
 267. The Hawaii Supreme Court upheld the ability to randomly drug test parolees as a 
condition of their release. See State v. Morris, 806 P.2d 407 (Haw. 1991). 
 268. See Hawken, supra note 47, at 40. 
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probation.269  Judges give parolees a warning in open court that “any 
violation of probation conditions will not be tolerated.”270  If a parolee 
violates a term of her probation, she will immediately be sentenced to jail 
time.271 
As part of the monitoring strategy, HOPE requires that probationers call 
into court each weekday to determine whether they will be tested.272  Each 
participant is assigned a color code at their initial hearing, and a different 
color code will be chosen for randomized testing every day.273  If the 
probationer’s color is selected, then she must appear before her probation 
officer that day for a drug test.274  If the probationer fails to appear, the 
court immediately issues a bench warrant.275 
If the probationer fails the drug test, the probation officer completes a 
“Motion to Modify Probation” form that is immediately given to the 
judge.276  A hearing is held in conjunction with this motion within seventy-
two hours, and the probationer is confined until such time.277  If the judge 
confirms a violation, then the probationer receives a short jail sentence, to 
be served in short order.278  Upon the completion of the jail sentence, the 
probationer continues participation in HOPE, reporting to his probation 
officer on the day of release and subsequently on a regular basis.279  If an 
offender continues to violate the terms of the probation, then she is often 
confined to an intensive substance abuse treatment service.280 
Instead of the treatment approach to addiction found in the RHCJC and 
the WCC Court, HOPE relies on strict sanctions and immediate 
consequences to deter addicts from using.281  In HOPE, drug treatment is 
only provided to participants if the probationer fails a drug test, thereby 
 
 269. See id.; see also Rosen, supra note 263, at 13 (“[P]eople are most likely to obey the 
law when they’re subject to punishments they perceive as legitimate, fair and consistent, 
rather than arbitrary and capricious.”). 
 270. See HAWKEN & KLEIMAN, supra note 259, at 13; see also Hawken, supra note 47, at 
40 (noting that the central theory behind HOPE is “the commonsensical one that certainty 
and swiftness count for more than severity in determining the deterrent efficacy of a 
threatened punishment”). 
 271. Upon a violation, the parolee attends a hearing within seventy-two hours, when, if 
the violation is upheld, he is sentenced to a short jail term, which may be served on the 
weekend if the parolee is employed. See HAWKEN & KLEIMAN, supra note 259, at 13. 
 272. See Hawken, supra note 47, at 38. 
 273. See id. 
 274. See id. 
 275. See id. 
 276. See id. 
 277. See supra note 271 and accompanying text. 
 278. See Hawken, supra note 47, at 38. 
 279. See id. 
 280. In contrast to other drug treatment courts, HOPE only mandates drug treatment if the 
probationer is not able to stay clean on her own. See id. at 48.  Researchers posit that this 
element of the program “economizes on treatment resources as probationers who are able to 
remain drug free on their own are not required to enter a drug treatment program.” Id. 
 281. See JUSTICE POLICY INST., ADDICTED TO COURTS:  HOW A GROWING DEPENDENCE ON 
DRUG COURTS IMPACTS PEOPLE AND COMMUNITIES 11 (2011), http://www.justicepolicy.org/ 
uploads/justicepolicy/documents/addicted_to_courts_final.pdf [http://perma.cc/2VXT-
B6EN]. 
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only targeting those “who cannot stop using drugs on their own.”282  
Participants do not have to meet eligibility requirements as they would in 
other drug courts, accepting people with all variations of criminal histories 
and different levels of addiction.283 
Part of the theory behind HOPE’s infrequent use of drug treatment is that 
not all drug abusers are addicts, and thus the expensive drug treatment 
programs should be saved for those who need it the most.284  If a HOPE 
probationer fails three or four drug tests, then she may be mandated to 
attend a residential drug treatment program in lieu of probation 
revocation.285  When the probationer is diverted to a residential treatment 
center, her success in completely abstaining from drug use becomes an 
additional condition for avoiding revocation of probation or a prison 
stay.286  This “as needed” use of drug treatment may lead to cost savings 
and ensure that spots in residential centers are open for those who require 
outside assistance to stay clean.287 
After the HOPE pilot program’s success in increasing probation 
compliance, the Hawaii legislature expanded the program, which now 
manages the probation of more than 1500 defendants.288 
After several studies were published reporting HOPE’s success,289 
Washington and California modeled their own programs on HOPE’s 
principles and procedures.290  In November 2010, Sacramento, California, 
started a HOPE pilot program.291  In 2011, Seattle, Washington, worked 
with the Washington Department of Corrections to implement their own 
swift-sanction program, named Washington Intensive Supervision 
Program292 (WISP).  The WISP pilot program launched in February 2011, 
and Angela Hawken and Mark Kleiman conducted a twelve-month study of 
the program’s male parolees.293  WISP shares the same foundational tenets 
of HOPE while targeting a wider range of parolees, including higher risk 
 
 282. See id. 
 283. See id. 
 284. See HAWKEN & KLEIMAN, supra note 259, at 32–33. 
 285. See id. at 33. 
 286. See id. at 33–34. 
 287. See id. at 33. 
 288. See id. at 8.  A national HOPE program was introduced into the U.S. House of 
Representatives on November 6, 2009. See H.R. REP. NO. 4055 (Nov. 6, 2009).  The 
proposition, while never passed, aimed to “reduce drug use, crime, and recidivism” and was 
modeled after Hawaii’s program. Id. 
 289. See infra Part III.A.4. 
 290. See BERNARD WARNER ET AL., WASH. DEP’T OF CORRS., COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS 
PRACTICES 2012 REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 7 (2012). 
 291. See id. 
 292. See id. 
 293. For a more detailed discussion of WISP, see ANGELA HAWKEN & MARK KLEIMAN, 
WASHINGTON INTENSIVE SUPERVISION PROGRAM EVALUATION REPORT (2011), http:// 
www.seattle.gov/council/burgess/attachments/2011wisp_draft_report.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
M4SG-9YXX]. 
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offenders.294  Additionally, several other states have discussions underway 
to implement a form of the HOPE program.295 
III.  MEASURING SUCCESS THROUGH 
QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE STUDIES 
Drug courts’ successes are measured by quantitative and qualitative 
studies performed by the court’s personnel, independent organizations, or 
scholars.296  The previous section introduced three different models used in 
treating drug addiction.297  This part discusses and analyzes the programs’ 
successes, including a discussion of scholars’ research methods used in 
compiling the results. 
A.  Quantitative Results of Alternative Drug Courts 
This section reports the quantitative results of the three drug treatment 
programs.  First, this section addresses the reason that quantitative methods 
are used.298  Second, it recounts the quantitative results for the RHCJC, the 
WCC Court, and HOPE, including graduation rates and recidivism rates.  
Finally, this section tackles some criticisms of each program based on these 
results. 
1.  Why Use Quantitative Methods? 
In measuring alternative drug treatment programs’ successes, researchers 
often utilize quantitative methods as opposed to performing detailed 
qualitative studies.299  The reason for this is twofold.  First, quantitative 
results are easy to measure.300  Researchers need only look to the rates of 
graduation, recidivism, and other program statistics to determine numerical 
success.301  Second, quantitative results enable comparison across various 
 
 294. See id. 
 295. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The Hawaii Opportunity Probation with Enforcement 
Project:  A Potentially Worthwhile Correctional Reform, 116 LEGAL MEMORANDUM 1, 4 
n.20 (2014). 
 296. See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text. 
 297. See supra Part II. 
 298. When measuring the success of drug treatment programs, researchers often use 
quantitative methods, such as graduation rate, recidivism rate, and other measurable factors.  
Part III.B discusses reasons for which quantitative measures may not be enough and how 
qualitative studies have been performed for other drug courts. See infra Part III.B. 
 299. See Holger Spamann, Large-Sample, Quantitative Research Designs for 
Comparative Law?, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 797, 798 (2009) (advocating for the use of 
quantitative research in comparative law, stating that qualitative studies “shed light on the 
same issue from different angles”). 
 300. See Kenneth B. Nunn, New Explorations in Culture and Crime:  Definitions, Theory, 
Method, 17 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y vii, xxi (2006) (noting how quantitative methods focus 
almost entirely on numerical analysis). 
 301. See RACHEL PORTER ET AL., CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, WHAT MAKES A COURT 
PROBLEM-SOLVING?  UNIVERSAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR PROBLEM-SOLVING JUSTICE 
1, 28 (2010), http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/What_Makes_A_Court_P_S. 
pdf [http://perma.cc/7ABQ-52J8].  In this comprehensive study, the Center for Court 
Innovation utilized yes/no indicators to gather statistics on a variety of factors in problem-
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types of drug courts.302  Quantitative results are a straightforward way to 
immediately determine what aspects of a drug court are producing increased 
graduation and decreased recidivism rates in the short term.303 
2.  The Red Hook Community Justice Center 
The RHCJC performed a comprehensive study, with the help of funding 
from the National Center for State Courts (NCSC), released in November 
2013304 (“the Report”).  The Report analyzes adult criminal cases arraigned 
at the RHCJC between 2000 and 2009.305  In the Report, the RHCJC 
compiled information regarding practices and recidivism rates at other 
traditional misdemeanor and drug courts in Kings County.306  In analyzing 
the drug treatment program, the RHCJC found that a total of 1452 
defendants were diverted to receive treatment for addiction, an average of 5 
percent of the total caseload over the ten-year period.307 
a.  Participation in Drug Treatment 
The Report explains why individuals with certain underlying charges 
were diverted to treatment programs more than others.308  For example, 
marijuana and traffic offenses receive lighter sentences in comparison to 
other drug or prostitution charges, thereby making the cost of the treatment 
program disproportionate to the severity of the offense.309  The Report 
hypothesizes that the reason for this is that the cases “assigned to drug 
treatment appear[] to be related to the severity of the potential penalty for 
the offense as well as to the tendency for the offense to be related to drug 
addiction.”310  Specifically, certain offenses, such as prostitution, may be 
committed to support a drug habit.311 
 
solving courts, stating that “[t]his simplification may sacrifice important detail and nuance, 
frequently reducing complex qualitative questions to quantitative measures.” Id. at 28. 
 302. See Spamann, supra note 299 (stating that “[p]rocessing . . . vast evidence requires 
quantitative methods”). 
 303. While quantitative results make these measurements easier on their face, qualitative 
studies may be necessary to determine what aspects of the programs have a lasting effect on 
the participants. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 304. See generally LEE ET AL., supra note 106. 
 305. These statistics were compiled from the New York State Division of Criminal 
Justice Services, the New York City Criminal Justice Agency, the Division of Technology of 
the New York State Unified Court System, and the RHCJC’s internal records. See id. at 14. 
 306. See id. 
 307. See id. at 97.  The study found the following numbers and percentages of individuals 
were diverted depending on the underlying charge:  violent/person/weapon:  113 people, or 3 
percent; marijuana:  thirty-eight people, or 1 percent; other drug:  795 people, or 22 percent; 
petit larceny:  forty-five people, or 9 percent; other property charges:  ninety-three people, or 
3 percent; prostitution:  107 people, or 7 percent; public order:  206 people, or 4 percent; 
traffic:  thirty-two people, or 1 percent; felonies:  five people, or 6 percent; other:  eighteen 
people, or 2 percent. See id. 
 308. See id. 
 309. See id. 
 310. See id. 
 311. See id. 
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The Report distinguishes between individuals who participated in one, 
two, or more mandated long-term drug treatment programs.312  Fifty-two 
percent participated in one treatment modality, 22 percent participated in 
two treatment modalities, and 26 percent participated in three or more 
treatment modalities from 2003 to 2009.313  There were a total of 722 cases 
over the period.314 
b.  Graduation Rates 
Between 2003 and 2008, a total of 44 percent of the defendants that 
entered a long-term treatment program graduated.315  Eighteen percent of 
the defendants failed the program.316  Seventeen percent had the status of 
“closed-other,”317 and 22 percent of the cases were still open after 2008.318  
During this period, 53 percent had a final disposition of convicted, 1 
percent had an ACD entered, 34 percent were dismissed, and 12 percent had 
a warrant issued for violating a term of the probation.319  In other words, 
approximately 34 percent of defendants who agreed to drug treatment 
successfully completed the program, having their charges dismissed.320 
c.  Recidivism Rates 
RHCJC’s recidivism rates were compared with traditional courts.321  The 
Report measures recidivism by analyzing the rearrest and reconviction rates 
within a one- and two-year period.322  Overall, RHCJC defendants were 
less likely to be arrested again than comparable defendants in the Kings 
County Criminal Court.323 
The Report also analyzes the recidivism rates of drug treatment 
defendants.324  The Report analyzed 252 defendants from the RHCJC drug 
treatment program who received a drug treatment mandate and 252 
defendants who had “similar cases” from the Kings County Criminal 
Court.325  Twelve of the 252 at the Kings County Criminal Court received 
 
 312. “Long-term” treatment programs are defined in the Report as thirty days or longer of 
treatment. See id. at 90. 
 313. Id. at 98. 
 314. Id. 
 315. Id. at 101. 
 316. Id. 
 317. As noted in the Report, it is unclear whether “closed-other” and “not closed” both 
denote a failure to complete the program. Id. at 100. 
 318. The completion rates for the six-year period are as follows:  42 percent in 2003, 49 
percent in 2004, 47 percent in 2005, 48 percent in 2006, 38 percent in 2007, and 34 percent 
in 2008. Id. at 101. 
 319. Id. 
 320. See id. at 100–01.  The Report notes that the low completion rate “suggests that the 
court may not have sufficient leverage over defendants to motivate them to fulfill the strict 
requirements of drug treatment programs.” Id. at 100. 
 321. Id. at 123. 
 322. Id. 
 323. See id. 
 324. See id. at 124. 
 325. See id. 
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drug treatment at the Misdemeanor Brooklyn Treatment Court.326  As the 
Report notes, there was not a significant difference between the sample 
groups.327  In RHCJC, 48 percent were rearrested within two years, while 
defendants from the Kings County Criminal Court were rearrested at a rate 
of 43 percent.328  The Report suggests that there is no significant difference 
between the recidivism rates in part because the “type of drug treatment 
intervention used in [RHCJC]—as opposed to deterrence and legitimacy—
may not be one of the primary mechanisms contributing to [its] overall 
effectiveness in reducing recidivism.”329 
d.  Praise and Criticism 
Public officials have praised RHCJC as a key reason for the decrease in 
crime in the Red Hook neighborhood.  For example, former Brooklyn 
District Attorney Charles J. Hynes credited RHCJC as the primary reason 
for the decrease in murders in two separate years since the court’s 
inception—2003 and 2006.330  New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio spoke 
at the facility at RHCJC in 2013 when he swore in the new police 
commissioner, Bill Bratton.331  During Bratton’s inauguration, Mayor de 
Blasio said that “the way to fight crime . . . is with the community.”332 
Proponents and critics have pointed to several ways in which this model 
addresses the underlying theories of punishment and ways in which it may 
cause conflict.  First, traditional courts may be required to implement 
certain sanctions as a result of a failed element of the program.333  For 
example, public housing often has a zero-tolerance policy when it comes to 
drug use, so a criminal court judge may be required to evict a family from 
their apartment if drug use is found.334  A community court judge, on the 
other hand, may work with the housing authorities to enable an addict to 
continue living in the residence so long as she is under the judge’s 
supervision, allowing greater discretion.335 
 
 326. Id. at 124–25. 
 327. Id. 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. at 125. 
 330. See, e.g., Charles J. Hynes, Community Courts Effective Says Brooklyn District 
Attorney, S.F. SENTINEL, http://www.sanfranciscosentinel.com/?p=4330 (last visited Oct. 21, 
2015) [http://perma.cc/P5XB-PZA8]. 
 331. See Praising Red Hook Justice Center’s Approach to Public Safety, Mayor-Elect de 
Blasio Names Bratton As Police Commissioner, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, 
http://www.courtinnovation.org/research/praising-red-hook-justice-center%E2%80%99s-
approach-public-safety-mayor-elect-de-blasio-names-bratt?url=project%2Fred-hook-
community-justice-center&mode=project&project=Red%20Hook%20Community%20 
Justice%20Center (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/U9M3-RBD7]. 
 332. Id. 
 333. See Dorf & Fagan, supra note 87, at 1510. 
 334. See Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 136 (2002) (noting the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development’s ability to evict public housing tenants if 
found with drugs). 
 335. See Dorf & Fagan, supra note 87, at 1509. 
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The judge’s subjective discretion, however, has also raised concerns.336  
Because determinations are made on a case-by-case basis, there may be 
some constitutional concerns because sentencing is largely subjective.337  
This is due to a shift in the court actors’ roles in a community court.  
Generally, the judge oversees an adversarial proceeding, with the 
prosecutor and defense counsel standing on opposing sides.338  However, at 
RHCJC, judges act not only in their traditional role, but also as an advocate, 
a broker of social services, and a part of the community.339  The judge in a 
community court may not have the requisite expertise for all potential 
arising conflicts.340 
Additionally, long-term drug treatment programs make up a small 
amount of RHCJC’s caseload, while utilizing a large percentage of the 
court’s resources.341  While the treatment program is catered to each 
individual defendant, there may not be the same incentive to stay in line 
with the program’s mandates due to relaxed judicial supervision and lack of 
structure.342  These concerns may represent some weaknesses within 
RHCJC and community justice centers, generally. 
3.  The Woodbury County Community Drug Court 
The WCC Court has received attention due to its unique structure in 
using community volunteers as the primary means of administering drug 
treatment.343  Several studies have tracked the program’s successes and 
failures.  First, Dwight Vick performed a multipart study, analyzing various 
aspects of the program.344  The studies examine the program’s impact on 
recidivism rates, look at its cost-effectiveness, and make several 
suggestions for how the WCC Court can improve in the future.345 
 
 336. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 159, at 79. 
 337. See id. 
 338. See id. 
 339. See id. (expressing concern that “drug courts forego whatever safeguards the 
conventional construct offers by instructing judges to play a more active and interested 
role”). 
 340. See id. 
 341. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 103. 
 342. See id. 
 343. See, e.g., Nick Hytrek, Woodbury County Drug Court a Success, Study Says, SIOUX 
CITY JOURNAL (July 16, 2005, 12:00 AM), http://siouxcityjournal.com/news/woodbury-
county-drug-court-a-success-study-says/article_75ee7751-3f2e-506b-8738-dbe7bd1b5e13. 
html [http://perma.cc/FAX2-EVDB]. 
 344. See generally Dwight Vick, Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Woodbury County, 
Iowa’s Community-Panel Drug Court Program, 1 POL. BUREAUCRACY & JUST. 44, 47 
(2002); Vick, supra note 230; Vick & Keating, supra note 6. 
 345. See generally Dwight Vick, Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Woodbury County, 
Iowa’s Community-Panel Drug Court Program, 1 POL. BUREAUCRACY & JUST. 44, 47 
(2002); Vick, supra note 230; Vick & Keating, supra note 6.  It should be noted that Vick’s 
studies focused primarily on analyzing the program’s effect on juveniles and did not do a 
comprehensive study on its effect on adults.  Therefore, the rates here may differ from 
studies of other drug courts. 
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Vick analyzed the court’s success through two major categories:  
graduation and recidivism rates.346  In his analysis, Vick determined that 
100 percent of the clients used marijuana at least once prior to treatment, 23 
percent admitted to using cocaine, 90 percent used alcohol, and slightly 
more than 25 percent admitted to using methamphetamines.347  About two-
fifths participated in the program for less than six months.348  Thirty percent 
were involved with the program for six months to a year.349  The remaining 
clients participated in the program for over one year.350 
a.  Graduation Rates 
When analyzing the graduation rate of participants, Vick found that 60 
percent of men graduated, while 63 percent of women graduated.351  Clients 
had a harder time graduating within the first stages of the program.352  Only 
62.5 percent of clients successfully completed the program if their treatment 
plan called for graduation within the first four months.353  Conversely, 
approximately three-fourths of participants who spent more than four 
months in the program successfully graduated.354 
b.  Recidivism Rates 
Of the WCC Court’s graduates, 44 percent did not recidivate.355  
However, the study notes that of the 66 percent that did recidivate in some 
way, many were likely to commit a drug-related crime:  only 20 percent of 
the graduates who did recidivate committed a non-drug related, nonviolent 
crime.356  In analyzing the recidivism rates, Vick also noted that 54 percent 
of marijuana users, 53 percent of alcohol users, and 50 percent of 
methamphetamine users recidivated.357 
 
 346. See generally Vick & Keating, supra note 6. 
 347. See id. at 308. 
 348. See id. at 309. 
 349. See id. 
 350. See id. 
 351. See id. at 311. 
 352. See id. at 313. 
 353. See id. at 313 n.201. 
 354. See id. at 313. 
 355. Id.  Here, recidivism was measured by looking at citations and convictions recorded 
in Woodbury County until December 31, 2004. Id. at 310.  Vick found that 53.3 percent of 
graduates did not recidivate. Id. at 318–19.  He compares this to the national average rate of 
recidivism in juvenile courts—30.8 percent—as opposed to a little over 46 percent here. Id. 
at 319.  He distinguishes that national study because it only accounted for two years after 
graduation. Id.  However, it should be noted that while this study began in 1999, the study 
does not distinguish between those who graduated in 1999—with five years between their 
graduation date and the end of the study—and those who graduated in 2004—with less than 
a year between their graduation date and the study’s completion. 
 356. See id. at 313–14. 
 357. See id. at 314 n.207. 
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4.  Hawaii’s Opportunity Probation with Enforcement 
State legislatures358 and federally funded researchers359 have 
commissioned several studies to examine the effectiveness of swift-sanction 
probation programs.  The studies analyze the programs’ successes in 
comparison to other probation practices.360  They use such indicators as 
number of failed drug tests, missed appointments, and other probation 
violations.361 
As part of the procedure at HOPE, drug tests are performed both 
randomly and in accordance with prescheduled appointments.362  
According to one study, probationers tested positive over half the time 
during the three months prior to their probation.363  In the first three months 
of participation, probationers had a positive drug test rate of 9 percent,364 as 
compared with the comparison group who tested positive 33 percent of the 
time in the same period.365  Finally, after six months, HOPE probationers 
tested positive at a rate of 4 percent while the comparison group tested 
positive at a rate of 19 percent.366 
Hawken and Kleiman found that of those who tested positive once, only 
half tested positive a second time.367  Of those with two positive tests, only 
half had a subsequent positive test.368  The probationers who tested positive 
more than once were those who not only received sanctions, but who also 
were recommended for enrollment in a drug treatment program because 
they “did not desist from drug use under sanctions pressure alone.”369 
Hawken and Kleiman also measured the frequency with which 
probationers missed their appointments.370  During the three months prior 
to enrollment, HOPE participants missed appointments with their probation 
officers 14 percent of the time.371  During the first three months of 
participation in the program, HOPE probationers missed 4 percent of 
appointments, showing a 71 percent decrease in missed appointments.372  
 
 358. See, e.g., WARNER ET AL., supra note 290. 
 359. See, e.g., HAWKEN & KLEIMEN, supra note 259. 
 360. Because HOPE is used as a probation measure as opposed to a comprehensive drug 
treatment program, results in the form of graduation and recidivism rates are not available. 
 361. See HAWKEN & KLEIMEN, supra note 259. 
 362. See id. at 17; see also supra note 271 and accompanying text. 
 363. See HAWKEN & KLEIMAN, supra note 259, at 17 (finding that 53 percent of drug tests 
in the first three months were positive).  In this study, Hawken and Kleiman used a 
comparison group against which HOPE was compared.  The group consisted of probationers 
who “continued on probation as usual.” Id. at 13–14.  For this group, there is no random 
drug testing; rather, the probationers appeared at prescheduled appointments once per month. 
Id. at 14. 
 364. Id. at 18.  This represents an 83 percent decline in the positive test rate. Id. 
 365. See id. 
 366. See id. at 18–19. 
 367. See id. at 19. 
 368. See id. 
 369. See id. at 19–20. 
 370. See id. at 21. 
 371. See id.  Comparatively, the comparison group missed appointments at a rate of 9 
percent. See id. 
 372. See id. 
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Meanwhile, the comparison group had a 22 percent increase in missed 
appointments, missing them at a rate of 11 percent.373  After the six-month 
mark, HOPE probationers missed their appointments at a rate of 1 percent, 
while the comparison group missed at a rate of 8 percent.374  Hawken and 
Kleiman attributed the dramatic decrease in the rate of missed appointments 
to swift sanctions and speculated that “most probationers are highly 
compliant with scheduled appointments.”375 
Finally, Hawken and Kleiman measured the program’s success by 
looking at how many participants had their probation revoked as compared 
to the control group.  They found that 9 percent of HOPE probationers had 
their probation revoked due to noncompliance, compared to 31 percent of 
the comparison group.376  Similarly, HOPE probationers spent far fewer 
days in jail as a result of probation violations than the comparison group.377 
B.  Qualitative Results 
This section discusses qualitative studies that measure participants’ 
perception of the treatment programs.  This section examines the 
ethnographic data uncovered through questionnaires and interviews in 
RHCJC, the WCC Court, and HOPE.  Then, this section addresses other 
qualitative studies of related drug treatment programs. 
1.  Why Use Qualitative Studies? 
Qualitative results amplify quantitative studies in analyzing drug 
treatment programs’ effectiveness.378  They provide information 
“compar[ing] the perceptions of those who succeed[ed] in a drug court with 
those who fail[ed].”379  Quantitative studies may not be sufficient because 
of the ways in which they are conducted.  For example, in studying 
recidivism, it is nearly impossible to ensure that “the differences found in 
recidivism reflect primarily criteria and processes of selection for drug court 
handling rather than program effects of the drug court itself.”380 
 
 373. See id. 
 374. See id. at 22. 
 375. See id. 
 376. See id. at 24. 
 377. HOPE probationers spent an average of 111.6 days in prison and 18.9 days in jail, 
while the comparison group spent an average of 303.4 days in prison and 20.1 days in jail. 
See id. at 26. 
 378. See Nunn, supra note 300, at xxi (“[Q]uantitative methods are based on an 
unquestioning view of objectivity that, while helpful for some purposes, is ineffective for 
interpretation and unable to access and describe the social construction of reality.”). 
 379. Andrew Fulkerson et al., Understanding Success and Nonsuccess in the Drug Court, 
52 INT’L J. OF OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 1297, 1300 (2012). 
 380. See Loreen Wolfer, Graduates Speak:  A Qualitative Exploration of Drug Court 
Graduates’ Views of the Strengths and Weaknesses of the Program, 33 CONTEMP. DRUG 
PROBS. 303, 305 (2006). 
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2.  RHCJC Interviews and Questionnaires 
The RHCJC Report recounts ethnographers’ findings from John Jay 
College of Criminal Justice who interviewed 100 misdemeanor offenders in 
the Red Hook neighborhood.381  As compared to Brooklyn’s downtown 
criminal court, offenders who were interviewed responded that Judge 
Calabrese and the RHCJC team were largely more lenient, were more 
caring, and would sentence drug offenders to drug treatment programs 
rather than jail.382  The study, however, did not report the effectiveness of 
the drug treatment programs administered by RHCJC, but rather the 
offenders’ general perception of the community court and its actors.383 
3.  Perception of the WCC Court 
In addition to the quantitative results, Vick found that the use of panel 
members engendered mostly positive feelings among the program’s 
participants.384  The panel was able to develop “personal as well as 
professional” relationships with the participants.385  However, Vick 
reported that volunteers had two major concerns when interviewed.  First, 
there was a lack of coordination among the agencies involved in the 
treatment process, which may have lead to clients relapsing due to the loose 
structure.386  Additionally, Vick described the interaction among the panel 
members during the meetings:  that volunteers were sometimes passing 
notes, whispering, and talking under their breath.387 
Additionally, two years after the court’s inception, Michael F. Nerney 
and Robin Wright conducted a review of the WCC Court, also specifically 
analyzing its effect on adolescent treatment.388  There, the researchers 
provided several recommendations for the future of the community panel 
treatment program.389  First, they suggested training the treatment providers 
and panelists so they better understand the variety of issues that may be 
affecting addicts.390  Second, they suggested having more positive 
interactions between the participants and the court’s staff so as to publicly 
reward good behavior.391 
 
 381. For a more detailed description of the study, see LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 21–
22 & app. E. 
 382. One survey respondent reported that “[a]bout 5 years ago, I got in trouble for some 
drugs, and instead of putting me in jail, [Judge Calabrese] put me in a drug program.  If they 
bring you to 120 Schermerhorn, you’re going to jail.  Over there [in Red Hook], it’s a lot 
better.” See id. at 40. 
 383. See id. 
 384. See generally Vick, supra note 230. 
 385. See id. at 30. 
 386. See id. 
 387. See id. 
 388. NERNEY & WRIGHT, supra note 243. 
 389. See id. at 11–13. 
 390. See id. at 11. 
 391. See id. at 11–12. 
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The Iowa Consortium for Substance Abuse and Research and Evaluation 
also conducted a study regarding perceptions of the WCC Court.392  
Researchers evaluated the program by analyzing interviews with the court’s 
staff members.393  Staff members made several suggestions for improving 
the WCC Court, including increased commitment and consistency of 
panels, more incentives for completing a stage of treatment, and more 
funding for treatment services.394  This study did not survey program 
participants.395 
4.  Hawaii’s Opportunity Probation with Enforcement Questionnaires 
In a review of drug offenders diverted to the HOPE probation program, 
Hawken anonymously surveyed a sample of 167 HOPE probationers.396  
She interviewed probationers and others involved in the program, including 
prosecutors, public defense attorneys, probation officers, judges, and other 
court staff to determine stakeholders’ perception of the program.397 
Hawken found that clients had a mostly positive perception of the 
program regardless of how they entered the program, whether they were 
incarcerated, and whether they received unwanted drug treatment as a 
condition of a violation of probation.398  In response to open-ended 
questions, many clients responded that the program was beneficial.399  A 
majority of participants reported that the program was not too strict and that 
it was useful in reducing drug use400 and improving relationships.401 
Some were unsatisfied with the subjective position of the judge.402  
Program participants—including defendants’ probation officers, 
prosecutors, public defenders, and even some judges—reported that the 
variation between judges in the severity of sanctions may be problematic.403  
Those who received stricter sentences as a result of a probation violation 
often blamed judicial bias, including ethnic bias.404  However, a 
 
 392. WHITE ET AL., supra note 223. 
 393. Id. at 91–92. 
 394. Id. at 92. 
 395. For a list of the questions used in these interviews, see id. at 108–10. 
 396. See Hawken, supra note 47, at 43. 
 397. See id. 
 398. Fewer than 10 percent reported a negative perception of the program. See id. at 42.  
Of those who were incarcerated during the time of their interview, only 12 percent claimed a 
negative perception. Id. at 43.  Even among those who received mandated drug treatment 
due to noncompliance with the probation guidelines, only 14 percent reported an 
unhappiness with the program. Id. 
 399. Hawken reports that one individual described the program as “strict, friendly, and 
fair,” while another stated, “[d]on’t give up on us!  It’s a matter of time before it will sink 
in.” See id. at 43. 
 400. Participants recognized that their choice was between “the drug or jail,” and thus the 
daily call-in system and the randomized drug testing had a positive effect on their 
recovery—96 percent reported that the regular random drug testing helped avoid drug use. 
See id. 
 401. See id. 
 402. See id. 
 403. See id. 
 404. See id. 
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comparison of the data shows that the difference is not between offenders, 
but instead between judges.405 
This qualitative study did not measure continued sobriety or quality of 
life among past participants.  Hawken and Kleiman acknowledge this 
shortcoming, stating that the probationers were only studied while they 
were participating in the program.406 
5.  Other Qualitative Studies 
The qualitative studies that have been performed with respect to the 
effectiveness of drug treatment programs have been minimal.  One such 
study was done with participants in the Greene County Drug Court in 
Arkansas.407  There, the study interviewed fifteen recruited participants,408 
including some individuals who were in county jail and others who were 
graduating from the program.409  All questioning was done within twelve 
months of the program’s completion.410  The study mostly analyzed the 
varying reasons for entering drug court411 and the participants’ satisfaction 
therein.412 
The study found, generally, that individuals were largely unhappy with 
the lack of confidentiality, that the program often only utilized counselors 
who specialized in alcoholism as opposed to drug addiction, that judges 
were largely subjective, and that individuals disliked the frequency of in-
court appearances.  Some individuals considered this final problem the 
catalyst for their “failure” in the program.413  A key distinction between 
those who completed the program and those who did not was that those 
who “failed” out of the program perceived the judge as unfair.414 
The study also analyzed whether the individuals were able to use the 
drug court program as a “chance to repair problems that their past drug 
abuse had caused to their family, friends, and community.”415  Sixty-seven 
percent of the graduates of the program and 57 percent of the 
noncompleters reported that their participation in the drug court program 
helped them regain the trust of their family, friends, and community.416  
 
 405. See id.  This perceived—albeit incorrect—bias is further evidence of why uniform 
sanctions may lend credibility to drug treatment programs. See infra notes 439–40 and 
accompanying text. 
 406. See Hawken, supra note 47, at 48 (noting that participants’ “long-term drug use and 
criminality is an important remaining question” to measure the success of HOPE); see infra 
note 455 and accompanying text. 
 407. Fulkerson et al., supra note 379. 
 408. The fact that the participants were recruited may show a selection bias in the study:  
by selecting only those that were willing to comply with the terms of the study, it may be 
that the interviewees represented only a subset of drug court participants. See id. at 1304. 
 409. See id. at 1303. 
 410. See id. 
 411. Many stated that they were advised to enter the program. Id. at 1305. 
 412. All but one person was satisfied with the program. Id. at 1305–06. 
 413. See id. at 1306–08. 
 414. See id. at 1312. 
 415. See id. at 1308. 
 416. See id. 
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Some suggested awareness that their behavior made friends and family 
“victims” and considered the program restorative.417 
The report, based on these findings, concluded that the drug court 
program benefited participants because they were “made accountable for 
their behavior and [were] required to adhere to a rigorous schedule of 
counseling, 12-step meetings, drug testing, meaningful employment, 
community service, and regular monitoring of progress by the drug court 
judge.”418 
This qualitative study is one example of an in-depth measurement of the 
long-term effects of a drug treatment program and may serve as an example 
to future studies.419 
IV.  SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE POLICIES AND STUDIES 
Various aspects of each alternative drug court discussed in Parts II and III 
have been effective, while others conflict with the rehabilitative goals of 
drug courts.420  This part examines and suggests several policies that 
alternative drug courts should adopt that consider the nature of addiction, as 
well as incentives for defendants to get and stay clean.  First, this part 
addresses several aspects of each of the three alternative drug courts that 
may be most effective going forward.  Second, this part discusses the need 
for long-term qualitative studies to better determine which policies are most 
effective in rehabilitating addicts in the court system. 
A.  How to Address Addiction in a Retributive System:  
Suggestions for Future Drug Courts 
While drug treatment programs will likely always have slight variations 
among jurisdictions, there are several aspects of drug treatment that should 
be implemented in every drug court.  This section provides three 
suggestions that may lead to a deeper connection between the court system 
and the issue of drug addiction.  First, drug courts should maintain an 
informal atmosphere, where a variety of court actors, health care providers, 
social workers, family, and other members of the community are involved 
in the process.  Second, drug courts should adopt consistent and predictable 
sanctions other than jail time to be implemented in the event of program 
violations.421  Third, regardless of the model, rehabilitative treatment—not 
punishment—should be the primary focus of drug courts. 
 
 417. See id. at 1309. 
 418. See id. at 1313. 
 419. See infra Part IV.B. 
 420. See Boldt, supra note 56, at 1246 (“This conflict is brought into clearer focus when 
the analysis is centered on the imperfect fit between the adversary system and rehabilitative 
regimes.”). 
 421. However, unlike HOPE, incarceration should be saved for the most serious cases.  
Labeling a drug addict as a criminal may be counterproductive to the goal of long-term 
rehabilitation. 
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1.  Maintain a Trustworthy and Informal Atmosphere 
Procedural justice is one drug court component that adds legitimacy and 
leads to increased success.422  Procedural justice should include not only a 
perceived fairness in the courtroom, but also an atmosphere that engenders 
trust and a holistic approach to determining an appropriate treatment 
program or sanction.  There are several small measures that drug courts 
should take to strengthen procedural justice. 
First, drug courts should involve a variety of actors when treating addicts.  
As is practiced at RHCJC,423 drug courts should utilize social workers, 
specialists trained in drug treatment and addiction, community members, 
aid organizations, and others that may contribute to appropriately crafting a 
treatment program. 
Having these individuals available will ensure two things.  First, the 
variety of actors will guarantee that defendants understand that they have 
access to and support from more than the traditional court actors—the 
judge, prosecutor, and defense attorney—involved in the decision-making 
process.  Because individuals often seek to identify themselves with 
groups,424 they may act in accordance with the group’s decision—i.e., the 
decision of the group of individuals determines the parameters of the 
program—even if it is against each individual’s self-interest.425  By 
intertwining the authority of the court with the community’s approval, 
defendants may be more likely to view the decision as legitimate and be 
more open to compliance.426 
Second, drug treatment experts should be required to help determine the 
appropriate treatment for a defendant.  A judge, while knowledgeable in 
many areas, may not be an expert on the psychological aspects of addiction 
or on the ways in which one sanction will affect the defendant outside the 
courtroom—by losing her job, her home, or her family.427  By having 
several people involved in the decision-making process, a defendant is 
guaranteed a treatment program that is personally crafted to her needs by an 
expert with the requisite knowledge.  Crafting an appropriate sentence for a 
drug-addicted defendant cannot be one-size-fits-all.  Every addict is 
 
 422. RHCJC names procedural justice as one of the main theories upon which the court is 
founded. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 7–8; see also supra notes 186–87 and 
accompanying text. 
 423. See supra note 206 and accompanying text (recounting the people who attend 
meetings discussing defendants’ progress). 
 424. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 9. 
 425. See id.  For a more in depth discussion on group identity theory, see Alex Geisinger, 
A Group Identity Theory of Social Norms and Its Implications, 78 TUL. L. REV. 605, 642 
(2004). 
 426. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 9. 
 427. The idea that one criminal charge can result in a domino effect of other 
consequences is represented in the theory of holistic defense. See generally Michael Pinard, 
Broadening the Holistic Mindset:  Incorporating Collateral Consequences and Reentry into 
Criminal Defense Lawyering, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1067, 1067 (2004) (describing holistic 
defense as “encompass[ing] the various underlying issues that often lead to clients’ 
experiences with the criminal justice system, with the aim of addressing those circumstances 
and preventing future criminal involvement”). 
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different, with varying psychological, health, and personal needs.  It is 
crucial that this is taken into account when determining how to make—and 
who should make—the ultimate decisions for treatment.428 
One way to accomplish this is through the program implemented by the 
WCC Court.429  There, the court employs, in lieu of a judge, a panel of 
community members who make the ultimate decision on how to sentence 
drug court participants.430  While the panel may not have professional 
experts, it may instill a sense of legitimacy in the defendant.  A defendant 
may be more willing to listen to a group of four people that have been 
through the same process and have stayed sober than a judge who may not 
have had the same experience. 
In addition to seeking procedural justice through the decision-making 
process, drug courts should maintain an informal courtroom that places the 
defendant on the same level—literally and figuratively—as the court actors.  
First, as is done at RHCJC, the judge should sit at the same level as the 
defendant as opposed to sitting on an elevated bench.431  The defendant 
should receive public praise for successfully completing elements of her 
treatment.  For example, the judge and court staff may applaud, provide 
verbal praise, or award offenders for particularly strong progress.432 
Further, the judge should always converse directly with the defendant, 
ask her to tell her own story, and ask for justification if she violates a term 
of the treatment program.433  This is particularly important in situations in 
which the defendant may have tested positive for drugs during a follow-up 
appointment or violated a term of her probation or treatment program.  
Instead of sanctioning an individual with no explanation allowed,434 it is 
important to have a hearing during which individuals may defend 
themselves, provide explanation, or discuss with the judge a way to avoid 
further violations. 
Allowing the offender to participate in decision making lends legitimacy 
to the process and encourages the addict to follow the treatment plan and 
rehabilitate. 
 
 428. While the treatment programs should be formulated on a case-by-case basis, 
sanctions for violations thereof should be predetermined and consistent, allowing for slight 
variations between defendants. See infra notes 435–44 and accompanying text. 
 429. See supra notes 223–58 and accompanying text. 
 430. See id. 
 431. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 8 (describing this set up as a design that is 
“intended to promote individual dignity”). 
 432. See supra notes 249–50 (discussing the procedures at the WCC Court for praise). 
 433. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 8 (“[J]udges are advised to treat individuals with 
respect, afford all parties the opportunity to be heard, and clearly explain the rationale behind 
their decisions.”). 
 434. While HOPE has a hearing to determine whether there was an actual violation, the 
program does not allow for the probationer to put on a defense, see Hawken, supra note 47, 
at 38, while the RHCJC allows for a hearing with the possibility of presenting a defense 
following any violation, see LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 93–94. 
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2.  Implement Swift and Predictable Sanctions 
Drug courts should utilize immediate and predictable sanctions that apply 
to violations of the program or parole.  While a punishment may have slight 
variations among defendants with the same violation, it should be uniform 
practice to apply sanctions for all defendants who commit each particular 
type of violation.  The sanctions should be known, immediate, and 
consistent in kind both among judges and among defendants.  The 
sanctions, while predetermined and immediate, should not include 
incarceration.435 
The sanctions should be uniform according to the type of violation, while 
still leaving room for slight variations among defendants based on their 
particular circumstances.  This would result in a range of predetermined 
sanctions for each violation.  For example, missing an appointment would 
always result in increased court appearances.  However, the number of 
increased court appearances could vary among defendants depending on 
their particular circumstances and the reasons for which the appointment 
was missed.436  Because of the individualized needs of each defendant, in 
the event of a violation, a hearing should be held to determine the nature of 
the violation and the appropriate sanction, according to the range already in 
place at the drug court.  This would ensure that defendants are aware of the 
consequences of violations while still allowing drug courts to treat the 
individual needs of each defendant. 
The sanctions should be uniform and swift for three reasons.  First, 
individuals are not forward thinking and may respond more strongly to 
immediate consequences.437  For example, the defendant who knows that 
she will receive a punishment several months in the future is much more 
likely to violate the terms of her probation than the defendant who will be 
given an immediate sanction.438  Therefore, if the sanction is known and 
immediate, a defendant may be more likely to comply with the terms of the 
sentence or probation. 
Second, uniformity among sanctions may provide more legitimacy to the 
drug court proceedings.  If two similarly situated defendants receive 
different sanctions for an unexcused probation violation or different 
treatment plans—one receiving increased court appearances and the other 
termination from the program—they may not perceive the decision to be 
legitimate, thus threatening their treatment.  For example, in the HOPE 
 
 435. As some scholars have speculated, incarceration may never be an appropriate means 
of rehabilitating an addict. See Hora & Stalcup, supra note 152, at 724 (“[I]t is naive to 
believe that merely incarcerating a substance abuser, that is, physically incapacitating them, 
will lead to recovery from addiction or cessation of alcohol or other drug use.”).  For this 
reason, incarceration should be used sparingly here. 
 436. See infra notes 441–42 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 212–14 and 
accompanying text (discussing the procedure at RHCJC in the event of a violation). 
 437. JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE 49–56 
(1985) (discussing how offenders are likely more impulsive, failing to take into account 
future consequences). 
 438. See id. 
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program, Hawken’s studies show that one judge consistently gave harsher 
sanctions for probation violations.439  The individual who receives the 
harsher sanction may blame bad luck or the judge, thus detracting from the 
program’s effectiveness.  While mandatory treatment may be effective, the 
offender must believe that the sentence is legitimate for the treatment to 
work.440 
While uniformity is important in drug treatment, courts should allow for 
justifications and defenses by the defendant before a sanction is imposed.  
A hearing determining the nature of the violation and the appropriate 
sanction within the predetermined range should be held.441  A judge should 
be required to explain why she is choosing one end of the predetermined 
range over the other.442  This would help defendants not blame their 
sanction on a judge’s supposed biases. 
Finally, variation across judges and among offenders may lead to due 
process concerns.  One criticism of drug courts has been that judges become 
too invested in the proceedings.443  Instead of maintaining the traditional 
neutral role of decision maker, a drug court judge is intimately involved 
with the offenders, particularly in a community court model.444  Without 
uniform sanctions, the judge’s potential biases could affect one addict’s 
sentence and future.  Therefore, a consistent and predictable set of sanctions 
may prevent the risk of due process violations. 
3.  Focus on Treatment, Not Criminal Sanctions 
The Supreme Court in Robinson v. California and Powell v. Texas raised 
an important question:  Is addiction something that should ever be 
criminally punished?445  Drug courts have struggled with this question as 
well, wondering which punishments are effective for drug-addicted 
defendants.446  HOPE, for example, admittedly focuses solely on probation 
as part of the program and only turns to treatment in the most serious of 
circumstances.447  This question becomes exceedingly difficult—and 
 
 439. See Hawken, supra note 47, at 43. 
 440. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 7–9. 
 441. See supra notes 422–34 and accompanying text.  There are different reasons for 
which a person may incur a violation, which is why a hearing in front of a judge is 
necessary.  For example, one person could have missed a drug test because they were using 
drugs, while another could have missed a drug test because of a family- or job-related 
reason.  The sanctions for these two groups of people should not be the same. 
 442. These hearings may also lead to issues regarding judicial discretion in imposing 
sanctions.  However, it is necessary that there be leeway between defendants in different 
circumstances.  One solution may be to have detailed guidelines drafted at the inception of a 
drug court that clearly lay out when and how a defendant should be sanctioned. 
 443. See Trent Oram & Kara Gleckler, An Analysis of the Constitutional Issues 
Implicated in Drug Courts, 42 IDAHO L. REV. 471, 528 (2006) (discussing the drug court 
judge as “an active team-member,” quite different from a judge in her traditional role as a 
neutral party). 
 444. See id.; see also Calabrese, supra note 186. 
 445. See supra notes 58–81 and accompanying text. 
 446. See supra notes 82–106 and accompanying text. 
 447. See supra notes 146–60 and accompanying text. 
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important—when considering the number of people who are under the 
influence of drugs when committing a crime.448  When formulating drug 
court policy, it is important to consider where to draw the line between 
addiction and mal-intentioned crime. 
Some suggest that the solution is to eliminate criminal sanctions from 
drug treatment completely.449  This suggestion should not be swept away.  
Designing a program where the sole focus is deterring others or punishing 
drug-related crimes fails to acknowledge addiction as a disease.  Treatment 
programs should give addicts a set of tools to use in their recovery.  Using 
solely deterrence theory by way of criminal sentencing in drug courts will 
not treat addiction; it will only perpetuate the consequences to addicts of 
continuing without such tools. 
B.  Quantitative and Qualitative Studies:  
How to Measure Drug Courts’ Success 
Most studies regarding the success of alternative drug courts have been 
measured quantitatively.  The reason for this is that measuring recidivism 
and graduation rates is relatively easy.450  Statistics can be used as a proxy 
for determining whether addicts have overcome their addiction without 
spending time and money prying into their lives post-release.  However, to 
be in recovery451 does not mean that one is cured, and the effects of drug 
treatment programs cannot be measured simply by checking a “yes” or 
“no.”  Instead, other factors, including long-term progress, must be taken 
into account.  These factors may include whether the individual has 
reconnected ties with the community, whether she has successfully 
maintained a job, and whether she has continued with a twelve-step 
program.452 
Additionally, reoffending is not necessarily a sign that an addict has 
“failed” a treatment program.453  Recovery is ongoing and cannot only be 
measured by graduation from a court-mandated treatment program or 
 
 448. One statistic finds that 80 percent of adults incarcerated for felonies (i) were regular 
alcohol or drug abusers, (ii) had been convicted of an alcohol- or drug-related violation, (iii) 
were under the influence of alcohol or drugs during the commission of the crime, or (iv) or 
committed the crime to support a drug habit. See Hora & Stalcup, supra note 152, at 720. 
 449. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.  Some believe that rehabilitation as a 
sentencing theory should be eliminated completely.  According to Judge Morris Hoffman, 
“The scandal of America’s drug courts is that we have rushed headlong into them—driven 
by politics, judicial pop-psychopharmacology, fuzzy-headed notions about ‘restorative 
justice’ and ‘therapeutic jurisprudence’ . . . .” Andrew Fulkerson, How Much Process Is Due 
in the Drug Court, 48 CRIM. LAW BULL. 653, 660 (2012). 
 450. See supra notes 299–303 and accompanying text. 
 451. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (defining recovery). 
 452. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 48, at 291 (citation omitted) (“A parolee, for example, 
who relapses and is arrested for possession of heroin would be classified as a recidivist when 
he returns to jail.  To the drug counselor, however, if the addict commits no other crime but 
to be in possession of heroin and has demonstrated progress in other life areas during an 
extended period of sobriety, the ‘offense’ is consistent with the dictates of the disease, which 
by nature involves relapse.”). 
 453. For working definitions of addiction and recovery, see supra note 28 and 
accompanying text. 
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abstaining from crime.  During recovery, a participant may relapse, but this 
does not erase the work she has done up until that point.  If this person is 
arrested because of her drug use, then she will be counted as a “failure”—as 
someone who contributed to the recidivism rate.  However, in reality, the 
person may not have been arrested because of a failure of the program or a 
policy therein, but instead because of the ongoing nature of recovery. 
Quantitative studies that measure recidivism and graduation rates do not 
take these circumstances into account.454  With these studies, the metric of 
success is for a short, finite period.455  Without having more in-depth and 
long-term studies, it is impossible truly to know which policies successfully 
treat addicts and which conflict with rehabilitative ideals. 
One low-cost solution would be to have a series of questionnaires sent to 
all participants—both those that graduated and those who were terminated.  
Programs could administer these questionnaires when each individual 
leaves the program and then again at yearly intervals.456  To encourage 
completion, the questionnaires should be simple and evaluate three things.  
First, they should measure participants’ perception of certain aspects of 
their treatment.  This section would include questions regarding procedural 
justice, the atmosphere in the courtroom, the parameters of their treatment, 
and whether the defendants perceived the sentence and sanction to be 
appropriate.  It should also include a section asking participants to articulate 
the aspects of the treatment program they found to be most effective. 
Second, the questionnaires should inquire into past participants’ current 
lives, including relationships with family and friends, employment, and 
whether they have meaningfully reintegrated into society.457  Finally, the 
questionnaires could address the status of the individual’s recovery and 
whether they have maintained sobriety, relapsed, or reoffended. 
In deterrence-based probation programs such as HOPE, there may be an 
issue with participants circumventing the system.  A probationer may 
discover a way to change her behavior for a short length of time, just long 
enough to fulfill the probation requirements.458  For example, HOPE is 
considered a successful solution to probation violations because it shows a 
 
 454. See Thompson, supra note 159, at 98 (“Success will need to be measured from a 
number of different, and perhaps competing, vantage points.”). 
 455. For example, many studies stop after probation ends or are only able to measure one 
or two years past the graduation date for cost reasons.  Hawken and Kleiman’s study on 
HOPE, for example, only followed up with probationers for a year after their probation 
terminated. See HAWKEN & KLEIMAN, supra note 259, at 48–49. 
 456. While sobriety is lifelong, the questionnaires could not realistically be distributed 
every year for the rest of an addict’s life.  Therefore, a period of five years may accomplish 
the goal without being overly burdensome.  These questionnaires may also raise an issue of 
selection bias where the only individuals to complete them would be the ones most receptive 
to the program.  One solution may be to have the completion of the questionnaires—at least 
for a time—be a term of inactive probation after individuals have left the program. 
 457. This section of the questionnaire could be modeled after that used in the Arkansas 
study, discussed supra notes 415–17 and accompanying text. 
 458. HOPE requires that probationers continuously pass drug tests and attend 
appointments with their probation officers.  It does not provide drug treatment unless the 
probationer continuously violates the terms of his probation. See supra Part II.C. 
902 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
significant decrease in positive drug tests throughout the course of 
probation.459  However, because HOPE does not incorporate twelve-step 
programs or teach offenders how to maintain their sobriety beyond the 
realm of probation, probationers may reoffend or continue using as soon as 
they are no longer under the purview of the criminal justice system.  While 
probationers may view the continued threat of sanctions as a deterrent to 
relapsing during the program, once the threat of sanctions is removed, it is 
unclear how many will return to using drugs, regardless of whether they 
reoffend.460  Therefore, swift sanction programs provide no evidence of 
how effective HOPE is at treating addicts, only evidence on how effective it 
is in promoting compliance with the terms of probation.461 
To determine whether the programs are truly working, researchers must 
perform qualitative and long-term studies, tracking offenders’ progress far 
beyond the program’s completion.  Requiring questionnaires after the end 
of probation would easily measure the quality of the drug treatment on 
offenders’ lives without incurring significant costs.  These would alert 
courts to policies that may or may not be effective in rehabilitating drug-
addicted defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts and legislatures have consistently struggled with the sentencing 
and treatment of drug-addicted defendants.  In an attempt to solve this 
problem, several jurisdictions have created alternative drug courts with 
varying policies that are geared toward lowering crime rates while 
providing meaningful treatment to addicts.  These include community 
courts, such as the Red Hook Community Justice Center, courts using 
community volunteers to help determine and administer a treatment plan, 
such as the Woodbury County Community Drug Court, and swift sanction 
probation programs, such as Hawaii’s Opportunity Probation with 
Enforcement.  These programs have seen success in terms of quantitative 
measures, but their qualitative long-term success for addicts is yet to be 
determined. 
When treating drug-addicted offenders, the solution can never be to place 
a Band-Aid on a bullet hole.  Because addiction is a lifelong struggle, the 
solution must be one that provides offenders with the tools to continue to 
 
 459. See supra notes 362–66 and accompanying text. 
 460. Some probationers acknowledge the strength of the deterrent factors during 
participation in HOPE. See HAWKEN & KLEIMAN, supra note 259, at 38 (“Some 
probationers, when told by their probation officers that their testing frequency is being 
stepped down as a reward request that it not be stepped down, because they fear that less-
frequent testing will increase their risk of going back to drug use.”). 
 461. Even proponents of the HOPE model acknowledge that the persistence of the 
“HOPE-effect” has not been studied. See Hawken & Kleiman, supra note 259, at 50.  The 
report notes that one limitation of the study was that probationers were only examined while 
participating in the program, and therefore Hawken and Kleiman could not conclude 
“whether the effects of HOPE (e.g., reduced drug use and new arrests) continue after 
probationers complete their probation terms under HOPE.” Id.  Hawken and Kleiman 
acknowledged the importance of this outstanding question. See id. 
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live a drug-free life beyond the purview of the court system.  If the goal is 
truly rehabilitation, the only way to accomplish it is to ensure that the 
underlying reason for which an individual is committing crimes—
addiction—is addressed on a therapeutic and long-lasting level. 
